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I. INTRODUCTION

On the night of September 21, 1994, Christy Brzonkala's life changed
forever.' An undergraduate student at Virginia Polytechnic and State
University, Christy spent that evening in her dormitory with a female
friend. 2 They had just met two male students-members of the university's
football team.3
When her friend left her alone with one of the players, he requested that
Christy engage in sexual intercourse with him.4 After Christy rejected his

1. This account is based on the facts ofBrzonkala v. VirginiaPolytechnic& State Univ., 935
F. Supp. 779,782 (W.D. Va. 1996) rev'd sub nom. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State
Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997), vacated, reh'g granted en bane, (Feb. 5, 1998).
2. See id.
3. See id. at 781.
4. See id. at 782.
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invitations twice, the man overpowered and raped her.' Discovering the
rape in progress, the other player took his own turn with her.' Finally, the
first rapist forced intercourse a second time.7
When the university's complaint process failed her, Christy filed a civil
complaint in the Western District of Virginia on March 1, 1996. She sued
both rapists, charging that the acts "were motivated wholly by
discriminatory animus toward her gender and were not random acts of
violence." 9 The claim relied primarily on Title III of the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA).1'
The defendants' counsel argued that, in passing the VAWA, Congress
had exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause" because domestic
violence did not substantially affect interstate commerce.' 2 Defense
1995 United States Supreme
counsel's argument rested on a revolutionary
13
Lopez.
v.
States
United
decision:
Court
The district judge agreed with the defense, noting that "constitutional
limits must be respected if our federal system is to survive." 4 The judge
dismissed the VAWA claims with prejudice and declined to exercise

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 781.
Id. at 782.
The civil rights prong ofthe ViolenceAgainst Women Act (VAWA), providesinrelevant

part:
(a) Purpose: ... [rio protect the civil rights of victims of gender-motivated
violence ....
(b)... All persons within the United States shall have the right to be free from
crimes of violence motivated by gender ....
(c) Cause of action. A person (including a person who acts under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, orusage of any State) who commits a crime
of violence motivated by gender and thus deprives another of the right declared
in subsection (b) of this section shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for
the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory
relief, and such other relief as a court may deem appropriate ....
(e) . . . Nothing in this section entitles a person to a cause of action under
subsection (c) of this section for random acts of violence unrelated to gender....
42 U.S.C.A. § 13981 (West 1995).
11. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8. This section provides, in relevant part: "[1] The Congress shall
have Power... [3] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes."
12. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 801.
13. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
14. Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 801.
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supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. 5
Brzonkala is unusual in the annals of challenges to Congress'
commerce power because it succeeded. 6 This initial success flowed from
the controversial Lopez decision. 7
This casenote explores the practical ramifications of Lopez.' It
examines the key arguments asserted in post-Lopez Commerce Clause
challenges, and recounts the responses to those arguments by federal
circuit courts. With that perspective, this casenote outlines a workable
methodology for evaluating the merits of a Commerce Clause challenge to
a federal statute.
Part II of this casenote succinctly highlights the evolution of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. 9 Part ll briefly analyzes the Lopez decision, and
surveys the legal community's predictions of its impact.2" Parts IV and V
examine the continued challenges 2 to congressional use of the Commerce
Clause in the wake of Lopez. These sections analyze why the courts have
seemingly responded inconsistently to the decision.22 Finally, Part VI
outlines a suggested approach for evaluating the merits of a Commerce
Clause challenge.23

15. See id.
16. A three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision on appeal;
however, that opinion has been vacated and an en banc rehearing granted. See infra Part V.E.
(reviewing challenges to the civil prong of the VAWA).
17. Lopez was the first-and last-time since Carter v. Carter CoalCo., 298 U.S. 238, 311
(1936) (striking down the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935), that the United States
Supreme Court used the Commerce Clause to overturn an act of Congress. See The Lopez Watch,
21 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Winter 1996, at 4 (discussing the minimal impact of over 35 Lopeztype challenges in 1995).
18. Many articles deal with the Lopez decision on more philosophical levels, especially in
light of the Supreme Court's renewed emphasis on federalism. See infra notes 64-67 and
accompanying text (citing articles). See generally, e.g., Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg,
FederalPowerandFederalism:A Theory of Commerce-ClauseBasedRegulationof Traditionally
State Crimes, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 921 (1997).
19. Law review articles abound recounting the history of the Commerce Clause. See
generally, e.g., Molly E. Homan, Comment, United States v. Lopez: The Supreme Court Guns
Down the Commerce Clause, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 237 (1995).
20. At the time of Lopez, some commentators viewed it as insignificant, while other likened
it to a new war over federalism. See Litman & Greenberg, supra note 18, at 921.
21. I have conducted an extensive review of federal decisions citing Lopez through the
beginning of September 1998.
22. Not all lower courts are interpreting Lopez with the same focus. For instance, courts
disagree over whether or not Lopez limits federal legislation to purely economic activities. See infra
note 417.
23. Success in a commerce challenge is exceedingly rare. Many lower courts seem to take
"the path of least resistance" and simply uphold statutes rather than rely on the shaky foundation
of Lopez. See Eric Grossman, Comment, Where Do We Go From Here? The Aftermath and
Application of United States v. Lopez, 33 Hous. L. REV. 795, 801 (1996).
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I. COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE

A. Early Jurisprudence
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution 24 -the
Commerce Clause-delegates to Congress the power to regulate commerce
among the several states. It is the vehicle Congress has used to regulate a
diverse variety of items and activities.'
In the landmark case of Gibbonsv. Ogden,26 Chief Justice Marshall first
explored the nature of the commerce power. While extolling Congress'
power to regulate "commercial intercourse,"27 Justice Marshall also
acknowledged that there are inherent limits on that power.28 In the next
century, the Supreme Court concentrated on state efforts to regulate
internal commerce. It often upheld regulations as proper,2" unless the
state
' 30
statutes "discriminated against or burdened interstate commerce. ,
In 1887, the focus shifted when Congress began to affirmatively
regulate commerce through means such as the Interstate Commerce Act
and the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.31 Prior to 1937 the Court limited
this expanding regulatory power with devices such as the "direct/indirect"
test, which only allowed regulation of activities that directly affected
interstate commerce.32
The Court often found that the effect of a regulated activity on interstate

24. See supra note 11 (providing text of the commerce clause).
25. See Deborah J. Merritt, Federalismas Empowerment, 47 FLA. L. REV. 541,553 & n.69
(1995) (noting that Lopez has only placed a minor restraint on Congress' commerce power).
26. 22 U.S. (IWheat.) 189 (1824). The Court held that New York's grant of exclusive
navigation of its waters conflicted with a license granted under the laws of the United States. See

id.
27. Chief Justice Marshall contended that "[the commerce power] is complete in itself, may
be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the

constitution." Id. at 196.
28. Marshall's view of commerce was not as expansive as his definition implied. "[The
commerce power] may very properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns more States
than one ....
The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated; and that something, if we
regard the language or the subject of the sentence, must be the exclusively internal commerce of a
State." Id. at 194-95.
29. See Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1888) (allowing Iowa to ban the intrastate
manufacture of alcohol under its police power); Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. (1 How.) 568,574 (1853)
(allowing Maine's intrastate steamboat monopoly).
30. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942).
31. See Leonard P. Strickman, Schools, Guns and the Futureof the Commerce Clause,1995
ARK. L. NOTEs 77 (discussing the emergence of the commerce power).
32. See A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,551 (1935) (using the
"direct/indirect" test to strike down federal New Deal regulations).
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commerce was too remote. In general, this strict application of the
Commerce Clause flowed from the Court's rigorous view of federalism,
which rejected congressional attempts to intrude into spheres of traditional
state action.33
B. Modem Pre-Lopez Expansion
In 1937, the Supreme Court began a steady march toward accepting
congressional expansion of the commerce power. This came in the wake
of the Great Depression and President Roosevelt's threats to "pack the
court" in order to uphold key New Deal legislation.34
In N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,35 the Court upheld the
National Labor Relations Act and replaced the "direct/indirect" test with
an easier-to-satisfy "close and substantial relation to interstate commerce"
years, the Court continued to accept an
test. 36 Over the next fifty-eight
37
expanded commerce power.
The crucial principle used to uphold previously untenable legislation
emerged in Wickard v. Filburn'S3 "aggregate effects" test. In Wickard, the
Court upheld amendments to the Agricultural Adjustment Act, and allowed
federal regulation of wheat production even where it was grown at home
for purely personal consumption. Using the "aggregate effects" test, the
Court reasoned that local activities could affect demand for wheat and
substantially affect interstate commerce when "taken together with that of
many others similarly situated."'
Notably, the Court began to show great deference to congressional
33. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 119-24 & n.21 (fully discussing the history of the Commerce
Clause).
34. See Grossman, Comment, supra note 23, at 821 n.173 (explaining Roosevelt's courtpacking plan, and the apparent capitulation of the Supreme Court to his wishes).
35. 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). The Court explained that intrastate labor-related activities are so
substantially related to interstate commerce that "their control is essential or appropriate to protect
that commerce from burdens ..."See id.
36. For more on the "direct/inderect" and "substantial relation" tests, see Homan, Comment,
supra note 19, at 250-56.
37. Even as the Court allowed the expansion of congressional power, however, it warned:
[Tihe scope of this power must be considered in the light of our dual system of
government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate
commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex
society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and
what is local and create a completely centralized government.
Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 37.
38. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942).
39. See id.
40. Id.
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findings. In some instances, the Court did not even require any
congressional findings. This expansion of the commerce power reached its
apogee with the Court's support of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which prohibited racial discrimination in places of public
accommodation.41 In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,42 the
Court upheld Title II where a motel discriminated against interstate
travelers.43
This early line of cases culminating in the Heartof Atlanta decision,
showed no practical limit on Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause."
II.

UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ AND ITS PREDICTED IMPACT

A. The Decision
Police arrested Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a senior in a San Antonio high
school, for firearm possession on school premises-a violation of Texas
law.45 The state dropped charges the next day, and a federal grand jury

41. The relevant portion of Title II provides:
All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of... any place of
public accommodation... without discrimination or segregation on the ground
of race, color, religion, or national origin.
(b)(1) [This applies to] any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which
provides lodging to transient guests... ;
(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other
facility principally engaged inselling food for consumption on the premises ... ;
(c)
The operations of an establishment affect commerce ...[if] it serves or offers
to serve interstate travelers or a substantial portion of the food which it serves...
has moved in commerce ....
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a (West 1994).
42. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
43. See id. at 261; see also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,304-05 (1964) (upholding
Title II where a discriminating restaurant purchased a substantial portion of food that had moved
in interstate commerce).
44. See Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: CongressionalFindings, Constitutional
Adjudication,and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASEW. REs. L. REv. 695,701 (1996) (commenting
that "by the 1980s the Commerce Clause game seemed about over"). Prior to Lopez, in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 840-41 (1976), the Court prohibited Congress from
mandating minimum wages and maximum hours, due to the "affirmative limitations" contained in
the Tenth Amendment. However, this case was expressly overruled in Garciav. SanAntonioMetro.
TransitAuthority, 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985), when Justice Blackmun changed his position on the
issue. For a discussion on these two cases in relation to Lopez, see Ann Althouse, Enforcing
FederalismAfter United States v. Lopez, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 793, 808-12 (1996).
45. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. For a full discussion on the facts and opinions in the case,
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indicted Lopez under the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990,46 which
created a federal criminal offense for possessing a firearm in a school zone.
Lopez challenged the statute on the ground that it exceeded Congress'
commerce power because it attempted to "'legislate control over our public
schools."' 47 The district court disagreed, however, and Lopez was
convicted of the offense following a bench trial.48 The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeal reversed, noting insufficient congressional findings and stating
that Congress had exceeded its commerce power.49
On review in 1995, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth
Circuit's decision and struck down the Act. Chief Justice Rehnquist's
majority' opinion delivered a federalism-based message, noting that the
M criminal law and
Act moved in two areas of historical state sovereignty:"
education. 2 Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, joined by Justice
O'Connor, 3 provided a more cautious, but equally federalism-based,
analysis of the issue. The dissenting opinions characterized the decision as
an aberration.54
The Lopez majority identified three broad categories of activity within
which Congress may exercise its Commerce Clause power. These
categories have proved key in subsequent lower court jurisprudence.

see generallyGrossman, Comment, supra note 23, at 808-14.
46. The Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C.S. § 922(q) (Law. Co-op. 1996),
amended by 18 U.S.C.S. § 922(q) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997), made it unlawful "knowingly to
possess afirearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school
zone." 18 U.S.C. § 922(q).
47. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.
48. See id.
49. See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367-68 (5' Cir. 1993), aff'd 514 U.S. 549
(1995). The Fifth Circuit focused primarily on the lack of legislative findings and the different type
of regulation present in the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990. See id. at 1366.
50. In the 5-4 decision, Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas concurred. See
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 550.
51. In dissent, Justice Souter balked at the notion that traditional state regulation should
factor into the analysis. See id. at 608-09 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Charles E. Ares, Lopez
and the Future Constitutional Crisis, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 825, 825-26 (1996) (speculating that
Rehnquist "opened the floodgates" for lower courts to dismantle intrusions on federalism).
52. In a lengthy footnote, Chief Justice Rehnquist identified criminal law as an area
traditionally left to the states. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 n.3. Moreover, he frowned upon the
logical extension of the government's reasoning, which would possibly allow Congress to mandate
a federal school curriculum. See id. at 565.
53. Justice Thomas, whilejoining the majority, also concurred on his own to argue for further
limitation of the Commerce Clause. See id. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring). He attacked the
substantial effects test, noting that it "appears to grant Congress a police power over the Nation."
Id. at 599-600 (Thomas, J., concurring).
54. Both Justice Stevens and Justice Souter dissented alone, while Justice Breyer's dissent
was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. See id. at 550. This section will present the
dissenters' rebuttals of the majority's reasoning point by point in the footnotes.
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First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of
interstate commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to
regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even
though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.
Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes the power to
regulate those activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce....
The majority, being careful to clear up confusion over the final category,
stated that a regulated intrastate activity must do more 56
than simply "affect"
interstate commerce; it must "substantiallyaffect" it.
The majority quickly disposed of the first two Lopez categories by
reasoning that firearm possession did not implicate channels or
instrumentalities of interstate commerce. 7 In the third category, however,
the majority identified four major problems with the Act.
First, mere firearm possession had nothing to do with commerce and
was "not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity."58
Second, the Act had "no express jurisdictional element which might limit
its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an
explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce."5 9 Third,
although congressional findings are not required, they were notably
absent 6° in the Act's "sharp break" from prior firearms legislation. The

55. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (citations omitted).
56. Id. at 559 (emphasis added). While accepting that the proper test was "substantial" or
"significant" effects on interstate commerce, the dissenters stressed that it is necessary to look to
the cumulative effect of all similar instances to make that determination. See id. at 615-16 (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
57. See id. at 559. In dissent, Justice Stevens alone argued that guns were articles of
commerce whose possession in any market were a consequence of commercial activity. See id. at
602-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 561. In the major dissent, Justice Breyer argued that distinguishing commercial
from noncommercial was irrelevant and not in line with precedent. See id. at 627-28 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Justice Souter argued the distinction was a step backwards towards the "direct/indirect"
test. See id. at 608 (Souter, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 561-62. Justice Breyer responded that no jurisdictional element had ever been
required in the past, as with 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)(1)'s ban on the mere possession of machine guns.
See id. at 630 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Moreover, the majority itself minimized the impact of requiring such a jurisdiction element
when it stated, "'[Where a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the
de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence."' Id.
at 558 (citations omitted). The lower courts have focused on this language in upholding subsequent
statutes under the Commerce Clause.
60. See Herbert Hovenkamp, JudicialRestraintand ConstitutionalFederalism:The Supreme
Court'sLopez Seminole Tribe Decisions,96 COLUM. L. REV. 2214, 2223-24 (1996) (suggesting
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absence of congressional findings prevented the Court from finding a
substantial relation to interstate commerce." Finally, the government's
expansive reasoning, if accepted, "convert[ed] congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained
by the States. '6 2
While joining the majority, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor concurred
separately to emphasize the delicate balance required when the Court
makes difficult choices on federalism principles. They warned that the
Court should not return to an outdated understanding of commerce. 63
B. Post-Lopez Predictions
In the wake of Lopez, scholars disagreed as to its impact. Some viewed
the decision as revolutionary: "one of the opening cannonades in the
coming constitutional revolution."' For many, it was confirmation that
federalism was not dead, and that Congress' powers under the Commerce
Clause were not plenary.65
Yet, as time passed and courts had a chance to absorb Lopez, many saw
the impact of the decision as modest.' Regardless of the speculated

that Congress may have simply become "careless" in not making findings due to popular support).
61. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563. The dissenters agreed that absence of findings might deprive
a law of deference; however, Justice Breyer argued that it made no difference since the Act had not
interfered with state authority. See id. at 617-18 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Souter contended
that the statute, itself, implied sufficient findings. See id. at 612 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 567. Chief Justice Rehnquist feared there would be no limit to congressional
authority, and maintained that Justice Breyer was unable to find one activity beyond the scope of
federal regulation. See id. at 565-66.
63. See id. at 577-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy's restrained opinion
balances what otherwise might be seen as truly revolutionary. For a deeper analysis of his position,
see Althouse, supra note 44, at 801-04.
64. Bruce Ackerman, Supreme Court Rules Ban on Guns Near Schools Invalid (National
Public Radio broadcast, Apr. 27, 1995) availablein 1995 WL 2958158; see also Ares, supra note
51, at 827 (suggesting that Lopez could reverse sixty years of Commerce Clause analysis); Steven
G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and EnumeratedPowers": In Defense of United States
v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 752 (1995) (hailing the decision as "revolutionary" and "long
overdue"). See generally Litman & Greenberg, supra note 18, at 921-22 (summarizing scholarly
positions on the impact of Lopez).
65. See Strickman, supra note 31, at 81 (contending that Lopez shifted the burden from the
challenger to the government); Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime Controlandthe Commerce Clause:Life
After Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 801, 842-43 (1996) (emphasizing the federalism view of
Lopez).
66. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Did Last Tenn Reveal "A Revolutionary States' Rights
Movement Within the Supreme Court?," 46 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 663, 664 (1996) (considering
Lopez a very limited decision); Peter A. Lauricella, The Real "Contract with America": The
OriginalIntent ofthe TenthAmendment andthe Commerce Clause,60 ALB.L. REv. 1377,1379-80
(1997) (arguing that the holding in Lopez may be limited); Merritt, supra note 25, at 553 n.69
(1995) (classifying Lopez as a "minor restraint" on congressional power).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol50/iss5/3

10

Kolenc: Commerce Clause Challenges After United States v. Lopez
COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGFS

impact, however, Lopez has had a practical effect on how Congress passes
legislation67 and what types of challenges are raised in an area that just a
few years ago seemed clearly to lack challenges.68
IV. CHALLENGES TO CONGRESS' COMMERCE POWER AFER LOPEZ:
THE JURISDICTIONAL ELEMENT CONNECTION

After Lopez, challenges to statutes generally targeted two areas: (1) the
lack of ajurisdictional element within the statute; and (2) the weakness of
the link between the regulated activity and commerce. Practitioners have
attacked legislative attempts to regulate a vast array of activities, from
firearms possession to child support enforcement.
This section and section V examine recent Commerce Clause
challenges across a broad spectrum, and discuss how federal courts have
responded to them.69 This section explores statutes with jurisdictional
elements. Section V analyzes those statutes upheld solely due to their
commercial connection.
A. FirearmsActs
The purpose of a jurisdictional element is to ensure, on a case-by-case
basis, that the regulated activity has a substantial relation to interstate
commerce." The following firearms statutes have withstood constitutional
scrutiny based on the fact that each possessed a jurisdictional element.
1. Possession of Firearms by Felons and Misdemeanants18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and § 922(g)(9)
The current version of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) ("the Felon Act") makes
it unlawful for any felon to ship, transport, receive, or possess---"in or
affecting commerce"-any firearm or ammunition.71 The most widely
67. See Candice Hoke, Arendt, Tushnet,and Lopez: The PhilosophicalChallenge Behind
Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 903, 913 (1997)
(outlining the new version of the Gun Free School Zones Act); see also Hovenkamp, supra note
60, at 2226 (arguing that Congress can fix Lopez with "boilerplate" language).
68. Criminal defense lawyers began raising challenges to "what seems to be every federal
criminal statute in the United States Code." Choper, supra note 66, at 665.
69. While some statutes have been highly litigated, the same arguments recur throughout the
circuits, as lower courts have attempted to settle the law.
70. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62.
71. This statute provides, in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign
commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to
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challenged of all firearms legislation, this statute has been attacked both
facially and as applied.
Without exception, post-Lopez facial challenges to the Felon Act argue
that Congress cannot criminalize mere possession of firearms because
mere possession does not substantially affect commerce.72 This argument
flows easily from the Lopez holding that mere gun possession in a school
zone does not substantially affect commerce. However, the federal circuit
courts73 have relied on precedent to overwhelmingly reject this assault. The
courts have distinguished Lopez based on the presence of the Act's
jurisdictional element-the statute in Lopez lacked this.74
While facially attacking the Act seems "hopeless,"'7 5 practitioners have
put forth various "as applied" challenges as a second front. The key "as
applied" argument questions the nexus between firearms possession and
interstate commerce. In Scarboroughv. UnitedStates,76 the Supreme Court
ruled that the Felon Act's predecessor statute only required a de minimis
nexus: 77 a showing that at some point in time the firearm had merely
receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce."
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1996).
72. Justice Kennedy's concurrence addressed the inadequacy of regulating the mere
possession of firearms: "In a sense any conduct in this interdependent world of ours has an ultimate
commercial origin or consequence, but we have not yet said the commerce power may reach so far."
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
73. The following list includes the leading cases from each circuit that have rejected facial
challenges to the statute due to the jurisdictional element: United States v. Crump, 120 F.3d 462,
465 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing to United States v. Wells, 98 F.3d 808, 811 (4th Cir. 1996)); United
Statesv. Murphy, 107 F.3d 1199,1212 (6thCir. 1997) (citing UnitedStatesv.Turner,77 F.3d 887,
889 (6th Cir. 1996)); UnitedStatesv.Williams, 128 F.3d 1128,1133 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing United
States v. Bell, 70 F.3d 495,498 (7th Cir. 1995)); UnitedStates v. Blais, 98 F.3d 647,649 (1stCir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1000 (1997); UnitedStates v. Garcia,94 F.3d 57,65 (2d Cir. 1996);
United States v. Gateward,84 F.3d 670, 371-72 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 268 (1996);
United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Bates, 77 F.3d 1101,
1104 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 117 S. Ct. 215 (1996); United States v. Farnsworth,92 F.3d 1001,
1006 (10th Cir.), cert.denied, 117 S. Ct. 596 (1996); and UnitedStates v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387,
390 & n.4 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 262 (1996); United States v. Hanna,55 F.3d 1456,
1462 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1995).
74. This may indicate that by boilerplate language Congress can regulate virtually any
activity. Or it could simply mean that since Lopez did not explicitly overrule these precedents, the
lower courts have been hesitant to do so. See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 60, at 2226
(discussing the ease of satisfying the Lopez requirement).
75. United States v. Bennett, 75 F.3d 40,48-49 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 130 (1996)
("claims made by appellants [that section 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional] ... seem to us hopeless on
... the law"); see supra note 73 and accompanying text.
76. 431 U.S. 563 (1977).
77. See id. at 564 (citing the prior statute). In Scarborough, a felon was convicted for
possessing a firearm. See id. at 564-65. While not addressing the law's constitutionality, the Court
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879

crossed a state line.78 Many other statutes relied on similar de minimis
connections.79
After Lopez, therefore, many argued that the Court had heightened
Scarborough'sde minimis nexus. Under this view, the government must
prove that each individual defendant's possession of a firearm
"substantially affected" interstate commerce. Unlike the de minimis
approach, the mere crossing of a state line would not meet this heightened
standard.80
Refusing to discard Scarborough,no circuit has accepted the argument
that Scarborough'sde minimis nexus should be heightened. In the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeal, however, the position has received judicial
support by the concurring opinion in United States v. Rawls" and the
dissenting opinion in United States v. Kuban. 2 Of note, attempts to
heighten jurisdictional elements in non-firearms legislation have met with
modest success.83
A related "as applied" attack contends that a timing requirement is built

stated that Congress intended to require that the firearm have moved in interstate commerce. See
id. at575 & n.1.
78. The Court explicitly rejected the argument that the gun must have a "present connection"
to interstate commerce. Id. at 568, 575; see also Carlo D'Angelo, Note and Comment, The Impact
of United States v. Lopez Upon Selected FirearmsProvisions,8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 571,583-84
(1996) (suggesting that Lopez may have put this holding in jeopardy, since "most goods have at one
time or another traveled in interstate commerce" and this would "invite federal regulation of almost
all state activities").
79. This is significant, since lower courts have held consistently that Lopez did not disturb
prior Commerce Clause holdings. See infra Part IV.D.1. and accompanying text for another
example of this principle in action.
80. For an example of this argument, see UnitedStates v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387,390 (1Ith
Cir. 1996) (rejecting defense arguments to heighten the de minimis nexus and find a firearm
transport from California to South Carolina as insufficiently affecting commerce).
81. 85 F.3d 240,243 (5th Cir. 1996). Rawls, a twice-convicted felon, attempted to purchase
a handgun by lying on a government application. See id. at 241. The Fifth Circuit rejected the
defense argument to heighten the de minimis nexus. See id. at 242. But Judges Garwood, Wiener,
and Garza expressed regret: "[O]ne might well wonder how it could rationally be concluded that
mere possession of a firearm in any meaningful way concerns interstate commerce simply because
the firearm had, perhaps decades previously before the charged possessor was even born,
fortuitously traveled in interstate commerce." Id. at 243 (Garwood, J., concurring).
82. 94 F.3d 971, 976 (5th Cir. 1996) (DeMoss, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 716
(1997). Kuban, a thrice-convicted felon, used a 9mm pistol to threaten teenagers to find out the
whereabouts of his fourteen-year-old daughter. See id. at 972-73. A majority of the Fifth Circuit
again refused to heighten the standard. The dissent argued that Scarboroughwas "in fundamental
and irreconcilable conflict with the rationale of [Lopez]... [Tlhe 'minimal nexus' of Scarborough
can no longer be deemed sufficient under the Lopez requirement .
Id. at 977-78 (DeMoss, J.,
I.."
dissenting).
83. See infra notes 127-37 and accompanying text (describing a challenge to the Federal
Arson Statute).
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into the Felon Act. In UnitedStates v. Casterline,4 the defendant argued
that, after Lopez, a conviction for firearms possession could stand only if
its interstate transport had occurred reasonably close in time to the
possession. 5 Defendant's derringer pistols had crossed from Connecticut
and New York to Oregon at some indeterminate time in the past. 6 The
Ninth Circuit, while recognizing the argument's validity, felt constrained
by Scarborough and precedent within the circuit which had previously
rejected this timing requirement.8
A final "as applied" challenge to the Felon Act will likely be successful,
but only under the rarest fact scenarios. If a defendant is prosecuted for
possession of a firearm with components manufactured solely within the
borders of a single state, the statute may not apply. For example, in United
States v. Mosby,88 a federal district court set aside a defendant's conviction
based on his possession of a firearm cartridge manufactured entirely in
Minnesota. 9 The Eighth Circuit reversed, however, finding that the district
court had erroneously excluded the cartridge's individual
components-manufactured
outside of Minnesota-from the definition of
"ammunition." 9°
In 1996, Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) by adding 18 U.S.C. §§
922(g)(8) and (9). The new sections outlaw mere firearm possession by
persons under court orders related to domestic violence, or convicted of
misdemeanors in domestic violence." Although they contain a
84. 103 F.3d 76 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 106 (1997).
85. See id.; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 ("recently moved in interstate commerce");
United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 527 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1328
(1998) ("[C]ongress's power to regulate articles or goods in commerce may not permit it to regulate
an item for eternity simply because it has once passed state lines.").
86. See Casterline, 103 F.3d at 77.
87. See id. at 77; see also United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1462 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995)
(quoting Scarborough,431 U.S. at 575).
88. 60 F.3d 454 (8th Cir. 1995).
89. See id. at 457.A convicted felon, Mosby possessed 89 ammunition cartridges
manufactured in Minnesota from out-of-state components. See id. at 455. Strictly applying the
statutory language, the district court agreed with the defendant that "ammunition" only referred to
completed cartridges, and did not include their individual components. See id. at 457. Since they
were manufactured in Minnesota, the government could not prove that Mosby's possession was "in
or affecting" commerce in ammunition. See id.
90. See id.
91. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(8) and (9) provide, in relevant part:
[It shall be unlawful for any person] (8) who is subject to a court order that(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at
which such person had an opportunity to participate;
(B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate
partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in
other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily
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jurisdictional element, these new laws for the first time single out a class
of non-felons and take away their right to bear arms.' Unlike all other
firearm disabilities in section 922(g), these sections also apply to law
enforcement officers.
The Fifth Circuit upheld 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) in United States v.
Pierson," affirming the conviction of a man under a court order related to
domestic violence who mailed a bomb to his ex-wife at her work.9' The
court relied wholly on the presence of a jurisdictional element in rejecting
the defendant's argument that court orders related to domestic violence did
not affect interstate commerce.95
Similarly, a D.C. district court upheld 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) in
FraternalOrder of Police v. United States.96 The district court denied a
preliminary injunction against the statute's enforcement, upholding the
statute based solely on the presence of its jurisdictional element.' Without
disturbing the district court's commerce clause analysis, the Fourth Circuit
recently reversed that decision on Fifth Amendment equal protection
grounds.9"

injury to the partner or child; and
(C)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the
physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be
expected to cause bodily injury, or
(9) who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence, to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or
affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce.
18 U.S.C.S. §§ 922(g)(8) and (9) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
92. See id.
93. 139 F.3d 501 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 220 (1998).
94. See id. at 502-03.
95. See id. at 503.
96. 981 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1997), rev'don other grounds, 152 F.3d 998 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g
granted, (No. 97-5304)(D.C. Cir. Nov. 12, 1998). The United States moved for summary
judgement, arguing that plaintiffs had not stated a valid claim. See id. at 2-3.
97. See id. at 4. Moreover, the court brushed aside both Equal Protection and Due Process
claims. See id. at 2.
98. See FraternalOrderof Police, 152 F.3d at 1002-03.
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2. Miscellaneous Firearms Statutes-18 U.S.C. §§ 922(k) (Obliterated
Serial Numbers); 922(u) (Stolen from Firearms Business Inventory);
and 924(c) (Gun Use in Crime of Violence/Drug Trafficking)
Although the Felon Act comprises the majority of post-Lopez firearms
challenges, other firearms statutes with jurisdictional elements have also
been attacked. First, under 18 U.S.C. §922(k), 99 it is unlawful to transport,
ship, receive, or possess any firearm with obliterated serial numbers that
has passed in interstate commerce "at any time." This infrequentlychallenged statute has met two post-Lopez facial attacks.
In UnitedStates v. Diaz-Martinez," the earlier attack, the First Circuit
distinguished the recent Lopez decision since the statute had a
jurisdictional element.01 Rejecting the defendant's contention that his
possession of firearms with obliterated serial numbers was a simple state
matter, the court noted that they had been manufactured in Brazil and
altered in Miami.1 2 In the later challenge, United States v. Hernandez, °3
the Second Circuit upheld the law, finding no real difference between the
Felon Act and 18 U.S.C. § 922(k).' 4
A second statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(u), generally prohibits the unlawful
taking of a firearm from the inventory of a firearms business. °5 Once
again, the statute's jursidictional element has saved it from attack.1°6

99. This statute makes it unlawful
knowingly to transport, ship, or receive, in interstate or foreign commerce, any
firearm which has had the importer's or manufacturer's serial number removed,
obliterated, or altered or to possess or receive any firearm which has had the
importer's or manufacturer's serial number removed, obliterated, or altered and
has, at any time, been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C.S. § 922(k) (Law. Co-op. 1996).
100. 71 F.3d 946 (1st Cir. 1995). Defendant was convicted on two identical counts after
participating in a street shoot out in Puerto Rico, firing 13 rounds from two firearms with
obliterated serial numbers. See id. at 948.
101. See id. at 953.
102. See id.
103. 85 F.3d 1023 (2d Cir. 1996). This case involved multiple defendants in a heroin
distribution conspiracy. See id. at 1026-27. The firearm with serial numbers obliterated was found
in a search of one of the defendant's apartment. See id.
104. See i& at 1031.
105. This statute makes it unlawful "to steal or unlawfully take or carry away from the person
or the premises of a person who is licensed to engage in the business of importing, manufacturing,
or dealing in firearms, any firearm... that has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce." 18 U.S.C.S. § 922(u) (Law. Co-op. 1996).
106. Three federal appeals courts have reviewed this statute after Lopez, with two relying on
the jurisdictional element to uphold it. See United States v. Hardy, 120 F.3d 76, 77-78 (7th Cir.
1997) (per curiam); United States v. Miller, 74 F.3d 159, 159-60 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
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The defendant in United States v. Snow 7 challenged 18 U.S.C. §
922(u)-based jury instructions that did not require proof that the handgun
he had stolen from a Wyoming hardware store had been part of a
commercial transaction. 8 Approving the jury instructions, the Tenth
Circuit noted no abuse of discretion."° "[W]hether the firearm in question
was transported for commercial or personal reasons is irrelevant; simply
' 110
by crossing state lines the firearm traveled in interstate commerce."
Notably, no defendant has challenged section 922(k) or (u) for lack of
a timing requirement-that Lopez requires the firearm to travel in interstate
commerce close to the time of possession. 1 '
A final statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c),112 creates a separate offense for
carrying a firearm while committing a crime of violence or drug trafficking
that "may be prosecuted in a court of the United States." In UnitedStates
v. Crump,"' the Fourth Circuit upheld 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The court
determined that the statute had an express jurisdictional element since the
predicate crimes were prosecutable in federal court." 4 Moreover, Crump's
predicate drug offense-he unloaded a 12 gauge shotgun on a drug dealer
while robbing5 cocaine--"not only substantially affects commerce; it is
commerce."1
The Eighth Circuit has used similar reasoning to uphold 18 U.S.C. §
924(c). 1 6 The Ninth Circuit does not even require that the predicate crime
be charged. 117 Moreover, the underlying "crime of violence" need not be
107. 82 F.3d 935 (10th Cir. 1996).
108. See id. at 938.
109. The court found a sufficient interstate commercial nexus by making it a question of fact
whether the firearm had crossed a state line. See id. at 939.
110. See id. at 940.
111. It would seem that such a challenge would likely fail, however. See supra text
accompanying notes 84-87.
112. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) provides, in relevant part:
(I) Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime which provides for
an enhanced punishment if committed by the use ofa deadly or dangerous weapon
or device) for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or
carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment [of five to thirty
years] ...

18 U.S.C.S. § 924(c) (Law. Co-op. 1996).
113. 120 F.3d 462,462-65 (4th Cir. 1997).
114. See id. at 465-66.
115. Id. at 465; see also infraPart V.C.I., dealing with the Controlled Substances Act.
116. See United States v. Bell, 90 F.3d 318, 321 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); United States
v. Brown, 72 F.3d 96, 97 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
117. See United States v. Staples, 85 F.3d 461,463 (9th Cir.) (holding that Staples could be
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a drug or firearms offense."'
With or without Lopez, federal courts refuse to strike down firearms
laws with even minimal jurisdictional elements.119 Facial challenges stand
almost no chance of success. 20 "As applied" challenges also face stiff
odds,121 except where no portion of the firearm or ammunition has ever
crossed a state line."
One explanation for the acceptance of minimal jurisdictional
requirements is found in the Lopez majority's own words: "'[W]here a
general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de
minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no
consequence."",123 Firearms legislation may, indeed, fit this description.
B. FederalArson Statute-18 U.S.C. § 844(i)
In contrast to the overwhelming judicial support of firearms laws, the
oft-challenged Federal Arson Statute (the Arson statute) has encountered
judicial upheaval. This statute makes it a crime to use explosives or fire to
24
damage property "used in" or "affecting" interstate or foreign commerce.
While the facial validity of the Arson statute has never been in
question," its jurisdictional element-a typical de minimis nexus-has
courts have refused to
met resistance "as applied." As discussed above,
1 26
heighten a similar nexus in firearms legislation.
The case which began the controversy-United States v.
Pappadopoulos'27-- closely followed on the heels of the Lopez decision.
Prosecuting Katherine Pappadopoulos for arson of her private residence, 28
convicted for carrying a firearm while distributing cocaine, even if the crime ofdistributing cocaine
was never charged), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 318 (1996).
118. For an example of a "crime of violence" as the predicate, see United States v. Yian, 905
F. Supp. 160, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (upholding a conviction under § 924(c) where the Hostage
Taking Act-18 U.S.C. § 1203-provided the underlying connection to interstate commerce), aff'd
sub nom. United States v. Lue, 134 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 1998).
119. See infra Part V.A. (discussing firearms laws without jurisdictional elements).
120. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 76-87 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
123. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 197 n.27).
124. The Federal Arson Statute, provides, in relevant part: "Whoever maliciously damages or
destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle,
or other real or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting
interstate or foreign commerce shall be imprisoned ..." 18 U.S.C.S. § 844(i) (Law. Co-op Supp.
1997).
125. See United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1213-14 (6th Cir. 1995).
126. See supra Part IV.A.
127. 64 F.3d 522, 522(9th Cir. 1995).
128. Experiencing financial problems, Pappadopoulos and her husband conspired with a third
party to bum their roomy Sacramento residence while they visited Greece. See id. at 524. Upon

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol50/iss5/3

18

Kolenc: Commerce Clause Challenges After United States v. Lopez
COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGES

the government could connect her home to interstate commerce only
through the natural gas utilities it partially derived from out of state
sources.' 29 The Ninth Circuit concluded that this connection to interstate
commerce was insufficient. The court found that after Lopez, the
government must always show a "substantial" connection between the
damaged property and interstate commerce. 130 In essence, it heightened the
de minimis nexus.
In the pre-Lopez case of Russell v. United States,13 ' the United States
Supreme Court had upheld the Arson statute, presumably indicating that
the statute's de minimis nexus was valid. 132 The Ninth Circuit, however,
found that Lopez changed the legal landscape. Since the statute did not fit
the first or second broad Lopez categories,133 its validity rested on the third
category's requirement of a "substantial" relation to interstate commerce.t335
The court rejected the government's "aggregate effects" argument,
which would have relieved them of proving a "substantial" interstate
relation in individual cases. Instead, the court found that the private
residence's tenuous connection to out-of-state natural gas was
insufficient. 136 Moreover, the court determined that arson
was a
137
noncommercial activity traditionally regulated by the states.
Since Pappadopoulos,the circuits have been in disarray on whether or
not Lopez heightened the de minimis nexus. While not overruling
Pappadopoulos,the Ninth Circuit has since accepted the "aggregate
effects" argument when applied to business property, reserving the
individualized analysis to cases involving purely private property. 38 The

conviction for the crime, her husband fled the country, prior to sentencing. See id.
129. See id. at 525.
130. See id. at 527.
131. 471 U.S. 858 (1985).
132. See id. at 859-60 (stating that Congress intended to exercise its full commerce power in
enacting the Arson statute). The Pappadopouloscourt, however, was addressing an area left
untouched by Russell-whether a private residence affected interstate commerce.
133. Lopez described three broad categories where Congress could legislate: (1) "channels"
and (2) "instrumentalities" of interstate commerce, as well as (3) activities with a "substantial
relation" to interstate commerce. See supra text accompanying note 55.
134. See Pappadopoulos,64 F.3d at 526.
135. The government's argument, based on Wickard, is the same reasoning accepted by courts
to uphold firearm possession laws. See supra Part W.A.1.
136. See Pappadopoulos,64 F.3d at 527.
137. See id. at 527.
138. See United States v. Serang, 156 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 1998) ("[All1 business property has
a per se substantial effect on interstate commerce."); United States v. Gomez, 87 F.3d 1093, 109596 (9th Cir. 1996) (reaffirming Pappadopoulos,but finding that the arson of an apartment building
substantially affected interstate commerce); United States v. Camacho, 87 F.3d 1323, 1996 WL

327094, at *2 (9th Cir.) (unpublished table decision) (limiting Pappadopoulosto private residences
only, while upholding the conviction of a defendant who had set and apartment building ablaze
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Sixth Circuit has adopted an almost identical approach.139
The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Corona,4 ' wholeheartedly
followed Pappadopoulosin heightening the de minimis nexus and rejecting
the "aggregate effects" view. Ironically, that court found for the
government anyway, since the fire had spread to a nearby leased
commercial building.'41
The Eleventh Circuit's mixed signals-initially following the Ninth

Circuit, but now abandoning that position-starkly illustrates the confusion

in the circuit courts. 42 Likewise, the Eighth Circuit, which at first rejected
Pappadopoulos,has now left open the possibility of a heightened nexus. 4 '
The Third Circuit implicitly chose not to heighten the nexus in United

with a molotov cocktail), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 411 (1996).
139. See United States v. Latouf, 132 F.3d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1997) (using the "aggregate
effects" argument to affirm a conviction for the arson of a restaurant that purchased out-of-state
supplies, but acknowledging that the government is always required to prove that the property has
a substantial relation to interstate commerce), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1572 (1998).
140. 108 F.3d 565 (5th Cir. 1997).
141. See id. at 570-71. But see United States v. Nguyen, 117 F.3d 796, 798 (5th Cir.)
(affirming conviction where an arsonist bombed a van that also damaged several nearby buildings
with rental property and business offices), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 455 (1997).
142. The Eleventh Circuit followed Pappadopoulosin UnitedStates v. Denalli,73 F.3d 328,
329 (11 th Cir.) (reversing a Florida man's conviction for arson of his neighbor's house), amended
in part by 90 F.3d 444 (1 1th Cir. 1996). Denalliwas cited with approval in UnitedStates v. Utter,
97 F.3d 509,515-16 (11 th Cir. 1996) (upholding conviction for arson of a public restaurant). While
not expressly overruling Denalli,the Eleventh Circuit indicated only lukewarm support for the
decision in United States v. Chowdhury, 118 F.3d 742, 745-46 (11th Cir. 1997) (affirming
conviction for arson of business property with interstate connections, but failing to cite Denallifor
support).
The Eleventh Circuit further threw confusion on Denalli'sinterpretation in Belflower v. United
States, 129 F.3d 1459(1lth Cir. 1997) (affirming a conviction for bombing a deputy sheriff's car),
cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 2308 (1998). The court left open whether the government, under Denalli,
must prove an interstate commerce nexus in each and every case. See id. at 1461-62 & n.4.
Recently, the Eleventh Circuit has apparently abandoned Denalliofficially. See United States v.
Dascenzo, 152 F.3d 1300, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 1998) (explaining why Denalli should not be
followed).
143. In the related cases of United States v. Flaherty,76 F.3d 967 (8th Cir. 1996) and United
States v. Melina, 101 F.3d 567 (8th Cir. 1996), the Eighth Circuit brushed aside Lopez challenges
to 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) as inapplicable, pointing to the statute's jurisdictional element and regulation
of business property. See Flaherty,76 F.3d at 974; Melina, 101 F.3d at 573. The court accepted an
out-of-state natural gas connection as a sufficient link to interstate commerce when a
restaurant-not a private residence-had been arsoned. See Flaherty,76 F.3d at 973-74; Melina,
101 F.3d at 572-73. However, in UnitedStates v. McMasters, 90 F.3d 1394, 1399 (8th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 783 (1997), the court expressly left open the possibility that Lopez had
heightened the nexus. While affirming convictions for torching a private residence, the McMasters
court stated that the property's status as a rental unit provided a substantial relation to interstate
commerce. See McMasters, 90 F.3d at 1398-99.
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States v. Gaydos.' 4 Despite the de minimis nexus, however, the court
reversed the defendant's arson conviction because her house was nonrental
house
property.145 The court found that no activity at the uninhabitable
48 and Tenth 149
147
affected interstate commerce.1 46 The First, Fourth,
Circuits have evaded the issue, leaving their positions unclear.
The Seventh Circuit, while not citing Pappadopoulos, seemingly
rejected its holding in UnitedStates v. Martin.50 Affirming the conviction
of an apartment arsonist,' the court maintained the de minimis nexus and
52 The Seventh Circuit continues
emphasized that the property was rented.
53
reasoning.
to accept the de minimis
Although there is no true consensus in the circuit courts in regard to
Lopez's affect on the Arson statute, some conclusions may be drawn. No
circuit will find the Arson statute facially unconstitutional; however, some
have heightened the de minimis nexus. In the circuits taking this approach,
the government is forced to prove a "substantial effect" on interstate
commerce as an element in every arson prosecution. Ironically, these same
courts have refused to find that nearly identical language in firearms
legislation demands a heightening of the de minimis nexus. The apparently
inconsistent handling of the issue may be explained by the long history of
congressional findings that firearms, in and of themselves, substantially
affect interstate commerce. 54 Regardless, only those arsons of unrented,

144. 108 F.3d 505,508 (3d Cir. 1997).
145. Seeid. at 510-11.
146. Seeid. at511.
147. The First Circuit addressed the question in United States v. DiSanto,86 F.3d 1238 (1st
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1109 (1997), with mixed signals. The court found that an
arsoned restaurant-located on rental property, with supplies and natural gas obtained through
interstate commerce-was property "used" in interstate commerce. See id. at 1247-48. Strangely,
the court quoted with approval both Pappadopoulosand Denalli, but in dicta left open the
possibility that a minimum nexus to interstate commerce may be constitutional. See id. at 1248 n.8.
148. TheFourth Circuit, in UnitedStatesv. Hinds, 125 F.3d 849,1997 WL 636810, at*1 (4th
Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1100 (1998), did not indicate the
required nexus, simply saying that the arsoned church "affected interstate commerce to the degree
necessary to support Hinds' conviction." Id. (emphasis added).
149. The Tenth Circuit recently ignored the issue in affirming the conviction of a racist
teenager who bombed the dormitory of two black students in UnitedStates v. Little, 132 F.3d 43,
1997 WL 767765, at *1 (10th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision). The court relied on the fact
that the students rented the dorm rooms. See id. at *3-4.
150. 63 F.3d 1422 (7th Cir. 1995).
151. See id. at 1424. Martin arsoned an unoccupied Illinois apartmentbuilding-unrented for
three months, with no utilities-in the early morning hours; however, two firefighters died when
one of the walls collapsed on them. See id. at 1424, 1426.
152. See id. at 1427-28.
153. See United States v. Wing, 104 F.3d 986, 992 (7th Cir.) (criticizing Pappadopoulos'
approach to private residences), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 2425 (1997).
154. For an example of this principle, see infra text accompanying notes 244-52.
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private residences will potentially fall beneath the higher nexus
requirement.
C. Clean Water Act
The Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, prohibits the
discharge of pollutants into "navigable waters" except under proper
permits issued by the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps).' Congress
156
defined "navigable waters" to mean "the waters of the United States,"
but the Corps responded to environmentalist pressure and significantly
expanded that definition in 1975. The modified Corps definition allowed
regulation of waters where their use "could affect" interstate commerce. 157
The two CWA-related commerce challenges after Lopez both come
from the Fourth Circuit, with mixed results. First, the CWA survived a
facial challenge in UnitedStates v. Hartsell.1 58 Facing fifty-one months in
prison and stiff fines for knowingly violating pollutant discharge permits,
Hartsell argued that under Lopez the CWA was an unconstitutional
exercise of congressional power. 59 The Fourth Circuit dismissed the
argument in a footnote without explanation, citing precedent."6
The courts are not likely to discard the CWA because long-standing
155. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311. Congress passed the Clean Water Act in 1972, with the intent "to
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 33
U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (West Supp. 1997). The CWA prohibits discharge, without a permit, of
pollutants into "navigable waters." 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1311(a) & 1362(12)(A) (West 1986); see also
33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(7) (West 1986) (defining "navigable waters"). Congress intended "to exercise
its powers under the Commerce Clause to regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed
'navigable' under the classical understanding of that term." United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132 (1985). See generally Elaine Bueschen, Do Isolated Wetlands
Substantially Affect Interstate Commerce?, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 931 (1997).
156. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(7) (West 1986).
157. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3)(1997) defines "waters of the United States" to include"[a]ll other
waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mud flats, sand flats,
wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the sue,
degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce...."
For further discussion, see Lori J. Warner, The PotentialImpact of United States v. Lopez on
EnvironmentalRegulation,7 DuKEENVrL L. &POL'YF. 321,343-55 (1997); Stephen M. Johnson,
United States v. Lopez: A Misstep, but Hardly EpochalforFederalEnvironmentalRegulation, 5
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 33, 67-74 (1996).
158. 127 F.3d343 (4th Cir.), habeas corpusdeniedsubnom. In re Eidson, 129 F.3d 1259 (4th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1321 (1998).
159. See id. at 348 n.1. As vice-president of Cherokee Resources, Inc., Hartsell oversaw a
wastewater treatment and oil reclamation business in Charlotte, North Carolina. See id. at 346.
Hartsell, the corporation, and Eidson-its president-were defendants for multiple CWA violations.
See id. at 346. The discharges severely exceeded their permits, at times resorting to illegal "bypass
methods" to secretly discharge pollutants into the sewer line. See id. at 347. Although the first trial
ended in a hung jury, a second jury convicted the defendants. See id. at 347.
160. See id. at 348 n.1.
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precedent supports the regulation of activities that cause water pollution.' 6
Challenges of regulations authorized by the CWA, however, have been
somewhat successful.
In United States v. Wilson, 62 defendants challenged the Corps
definition of "navigable waters," as well as the district judge's jury
instructions based on that definition.'63 The jury instructions required only
that the government prove the waters had "some potential connection with
interstate commerce" and that their use, degradation or destruction "could
affect" interstate commerce. 164
The Fourth Circuit found that, after Lopez, this language did not
provide the necessary close nexus to interstate commerce. 65 The court
struck down the Corps definition of the statutory phrase "navigable
waters," noting that the regulations did not require that water use have a
"substantial affect on interstate commerce."" The court stated that "[w]ere
this regulation a statute, duly enacted by Congress, it would present serious
constitutional difficulties, because, . . . it would appear to exceed
congressional authority under the commerce Clause."' 67
The Fourth Circuit's analysis may not be universally accepted,
however.'68 With few post-Lopez challenges to the CWA, this area is ripe
for future litigation. Thus far, the Fourth Circuit has accepted a heightened
nexus for jurisdictional purposes under the CWA but rejected it under the
firearms acts. 69 The issue has been left open for speculation under the
Federal Arson Statute. 70 Other circuits could follow the Fourth's lead.
The inconsistency is explainable by the "could affect" language of the

161. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 282-83 &
n.21 (1981) (citing early cases that "uniformly found the power conferred by the Commerce Clause
broad enough to permit congressional regulation of activities causing air or water pollution .....
162. 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997).
163. See id. at 255-56. A jury convicted James J. Wilson, CEO of a land development
company, of felony violations of the CWA for knowingly discharging fill and excavated material
into wetlands of the United States without a permit, under 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c)(2)(A) and 1311 (a).
See id. at 254. He was sentenced to 21 months imprisonment, one year supervised release and a $1
million fine. See id.
164. Id. at 256.
165. See id. at 256-57.
166. See id. at 257 (finding that the Corps "exceeded its congressional authorization under the

[CWA]").
167. Id. The court nullified the erroneous jury instructions and ordered a new trial, since the
jury may not have decided the issue in accordance with the proper jurisdiction of the CWA. See id.
at 266.
168. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 998
F. Supp. 946, 951 (N.D. I11.
1998) (disagreeing with the Fourth Circuit analysis, and upholding the
Migratory Bird Rule without resort to the Corps definition).
169. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 143.
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Corps definition. Those words invite a more tenuous connection to
interstate commerce than the narrower language of firearms and arson
legislation. Likewise, while firearms may be substantially related to
commerce on their own, the mere presence of a body of water may not.
D. Racketeering andMoney Laundering
Federal statutes prohibiting racketeering and money laundering contain
jurisdictional elements. Moreover, they also concern a quintessentially
"commercial" area. This sub-section treats these statutes broadly, since no
court has ever seriously questioned them.
1. RICO-18 U.S.C. § 1962
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) statute
makes it unlawful for a person who participates in a "pattern of
racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt," to invest such money
in, hold an interest in, or be employed by any enterprise which is "engaged
in or "affects" interstate or foreign commerce. 7 1 Courts have deemed this
de minimis jurisdictional nexus as constitutionally sufficient.'72
Outlining the accepted argument in support of RICO, the Second

171. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1962 (Law. Co-op. 1991). This statute provides, in relevant part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity... to use or invest,
directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in
acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise
which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce...
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity
...to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any
enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of
unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions
of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
Id.
172. The facial validity of RICO and related racketeering statutes is easily supported by the
mere existence of ajurisdictional element. See United States v. Torres, 129 F.3d 710,717 (2d Cir.
1997) (rejecting a facial challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 1959, which made it a crime to receive
consideration from a racketeering enterprise that is "engaged in" or "affects" interstate commerce,
in return for an agreement to commit a variety of crimes).
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Circuit upheld the statute recently in UnitedStates v. Miller."' Considering
the RICO conviction of a narcotics trafficker, the court rejected the
defendant's attack on the jury instructions, which only required a minimal
effect be found on interstate commerce. 74 Noting that Congress had found
narcotics trafficking to have a substantial effect on interstate commerce,
the court tracked the language in Lopez that apparently required only a de
minimis effect on commerce in such instances. 75 Therefore, the court
found it "constitutionally irrelevant" whether Miller's individual drug
conspiracies substantially
affected interstate commerce.176 Other circuits
77
have reasoned likewise.1
2. Money Laundering-18 U.S.C. § 1956
Generally, 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (the Laundering statute) makes it unlawful
to conduct a financial transaction involving unlawfully obtained monetary
funds or property, where the person is aware that the proceeds were
obtained unlawfully, and the financial transaction "in any way or degree
affects interstate or foreign commerce." 178 Various courts have reasoned

173. 116 F.3d 641 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2063 (1998). Gerald Miller, as a
member of a narcotics trafficking enterprise, aided in the planning and commission of various
crimes and murders. See id. at 652-54. This involvement with murder also placed him within the
scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1962's definition of racketeering. See id. at 654.
174. See id. at 674.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. For cases applying similar reasoning, see United States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 228, 235
(D.C. Cir.) (rejecting arguments from participants in a PCP and marijuana distribution network),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 635 (1997); United States v. Juvenile Male, 118 F.3d 1344, 1348-49 (9th
Cir. 1997) (upholding convictions of gang members who had committed murder and armed
robbery); United States v. Griffith, 85 F.3d 284, 288 (7th Cir.) (affirming conviction of a
prostitution enterprise manager), cert.denied, 117 S. Ct. 272 (1996); and, UnitedStatesv. Maloney,
71 F.3d 645,663-64 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding conviction of a Chicago judge who tookbribes and
fixed cases).
178. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956 (West Supp. 1997). This statute provides, in relevant part:
(a)(1) Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction
represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, [wrongfully] conducts
or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction... ; [or]
(2) Whoever [wrongfully] transports, transmits, or transfers ... a monetary
instrument or funds from a place in the United States to or through a place outside
the United States or [vice versa] ...; [or]
(3) Whoever, [wrongfully] ...conducts or attempts to conduct a financial
transaction involving property represented to be the proceeds of specified
unlawful activity, or property used to conduct or facilitate specified unlawful
activity, shall be fined ...or imprisoned.
...(c)(4) the term "financial transaction" means (A) a transaction which in any
way or degree affects interstate or foreign commerce (i) involving the movement
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that the Laundering 179statute's de minimis nexus survives scrutiny in the
same way as RICO.

Explaining the rationale most convincingly, the Second Circuit, in
United States v. Leslie180 upheld the de minimis nexus. Convicted for
conspiracy and laundering drug money through a real estate business, 1 '
Leslie argued that, after Lopez, every federal criminal statute required a
substantial connection to interstate commerce. 82 The court disagreed,
however, and reasoned that money laundering in and of itself would "have
ramifications in interstate commerce when taken in the aggregate."' 83 This
being so, the statute's
de minimis nexus did not facially violate the
184
Commerce Clause.
Leslie further argued that, "as applied," the evidence in the case did not
support a minimal connection to interstate commerce, since the two money
laundering transactions-$20,000 and $750,000-were purely local
transactions.' 85 The court first found that Leslie's mere belief that the
money came from out-of-country druglords would support his conspiracy
convictions."' Next, itupheld the $750,000 transaction's connection to
interstate commerce because the money involved both a multi-state bank
and rental property.187
The court refused to find that the $20,000 transaction affected interstate

of funds by wire or other means or (ii) involving one or more monetary
instruments, or (iii) involving the transfer of title to any real property, vehicle,
vessel, or aircraft, or (B) a transaction involving the use of a financial institution
which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce in any way or degree.
Id.
179. See United States v. Westbrook, 119 F.3d 1176, 1191-92 (5th Cir. 1997) (upholding
convictions of those who ran a chain of crack houses, and used the money to purchase two
Mercedes), cert. denied sub nom., People v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 1059 (1998); United States
v. Griffith, 85 F.3d at 288 (upholding a money laundering conviction involving prostitution
"massage parlors"); United States v. Jensen, 69 F.3d 906,910 (8th Cir. 1995) (affirming conviction
of car dealer who knowingly sold cars for cash to drug dealers); United States v. Grey, 56 -F.3d
1219, 1224-25 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding deminimis nexus in Money Laundering Statute, while
vacating conviction because the government failed to prove any connection).
180. 103 F.3d 1093 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1713 (1997).
181. See id. at 1096. The money laundering scheme was exposed when an FBI informant
arranged a $20,000 "test case" and a subsequent $750,000 full "drug money" deal as part of a sting
operation. See id. at 1096-97.
182. See id. at 1099.
183. Id. at 1100.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. Seeid. atl02.
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commerce, however.' 8 In that smaller transaction, the government did not
produce any evidence to show that the bank or "conduit business" involved
had engaged in interstate commerce." 9 Even the de minimis nexus was not
satisfied."9 The court chastised the prosecutors for falling to provide
the
91
minimal evidence that would have supported this light burden.'
The de minimis nexus standard has withstood attacks in racketeering
and money laundering statutes because the underlying activities had an
aggregate effect on interstate commerce. Considering the nature of these
activities, that conclusion is not surprising.
As the cases in Part V of this casenote demonstrate, courts have gone
out on tenuous limbs to uphold legislation regulating arguably
noncommercial activities. 92 What stands as remarkable, then, is the
Second Circuit's conclusion in Leslie that banking activities of an
intrastate financial institution do not, per se, have a minimal effect on
interstate commerce. 93 This clear inconsistency may have simply been the
method the Second Circuit chose to teach prosecutors the consequences of
poor case presentation.
E. Miscellaneous Federal Crimes
The wealth of federal statutes that possess de minimis jurisdictional
elements makes it inevitable that practitioners can raise Lopez challenges
in myriad settings. This sub-section details several of the ever-growing
number of statutes challenged on the basis of insufficient jurisdictional
elements.
1. Hobbs Act-18 U.S.C. § 1951
One of the most frequently challenged federal statutes, the Hobbs Act,
prohibits "in any way or degree" the obstruction, delay, or affecting of any
article in commerce, through robbery, extortion, physical violence, or its
threat.' 94 Since this de minimis standard has survived challenges in the

188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 1103; see also United States v. Grey, 56 F.3d 1219, 1220-21 (10th Cir. 1995)
(vacating money laundering conviction because government failed to prove connection to interstate
commerce).
192. For an example, see infranotes 330-41 and accompanying text.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 188-91.
194. See TheHobbs Act, 18 U.S.C.S. § 1951 (Law. Co-op. 1991 & Supp. 1997). This statute
provides, in relevant part:
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or
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federal circuit courts time and time again,' 95 it has served as the basis for
finding other similarly-worded statutes constitutional after Lopez.' 96
In United States v. Castleberry,97 the Eleventh Circuit recognized the
underlying reasoning for the statute's survival. Castleberry was convicted
of extortion and conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act for "fixing" DUI
cases while practicing as a private attorney. 98 Challenging the de minimis
nexus, Castleberry argued that Lopez had heightened the standard to
require a "substantial" connection to interstate commerce in each
individual incident.' 99 The court rejected Castleberry's argument and
upheld the Hobbs Act, contrasting it to the statute in Lopez, which
contained no jurisdictional element at all.2"0
The Hobbs Act targets conduct which, by definition, has some relation

attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any
person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation
of this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty
years, or both.
(b) As used in this section... (3) The term "commerce" means commerce within
the District of Columbia, or any Territory or Possession of the United States; all
commerce between any point in a State, Territory or Possession of the United
States; all commerce between any point in a State, Territory, Possession, or the
District of Columbia and any point outside thereof; all commerce between points
within the same State through any place outside such State; and all other
commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction.
Id.
195. See United States v. Farrish, 122 F.3d 146, 147 (2d Cir. 1997) (affirming a conviction
for stealing cars), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1056 (1998); United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205,
1208 (5th Cir. 1997) (upholding Hobbs Act where defendants robbed store owners), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 1104 (1998); United States v. Valenzeno, 123 F.3d 365,368 (6th Cir. 1997) (affirming
conviction for extortion under Hobbs Act); United States v. Woodruff, 122 F.3d 1185, 1186 (9th
Cir. 1997) (overruling district court which had heightened de minimis nexus to "substantial"), cert.
denied, 118 S.Ct. 886 (1998); United States v. Romero, 122 F.3d 1334, 1340 (10th Cir. 1997)
("[A] construction requiring only a de minimis effect... is consistent with Lopee'), cert. denied,
118 S.Ct. 1310 (1998); United States v. Harrington, 108 F.3d 1460, 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("Mhe
'substantiality' requirement does not apply in the context ofdetermining what quantum of evidence
is required to satisfy statutory interstate commerce jurisdictional elements."); United States v. Stillo,
57 F.3d 553, 558 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding Hobbs Act valid since it is aimed at an economic
activity).
196. For instance, the money laundering cases frequently cite to the reasoning supporting this
Act. See supra cases cited at note 179.
197. 116 F.3d 1384(llth Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 341 (1997).
198. See id. at 1385-86. The Atlanta attorney extorted money from his clients and bribed an
Assistant Solicitor in the Atlanta Traffic Court to fix his clients' case files in order to dispose of
their DUI cases. See id.
199. See id. at 1386.
200. See id. at 1387.
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to interstate commerce. Using the "aggregate effects" reasoning 01 it
becomes simple deduction that repetitive interference with articles moving
in interstate commerce will substantially affect such commerce. Courts
have an easy way to uphold the legislation.2 ' Despite the obvious validity
of the Hobbs Act, defendants continue to put forth weak defenses. 0 3
2. Violence Against Women Act (Criminal Prong)
Responding to national concern over domestic violence, Congress
passed the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which comprised a
civil prong ° and a criminal prong. Codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2262,205 the
criminal prong makes it unlawful to violate a state protection order by
either crossing a state line with that intent, or by causing injury to a spouse
or intimate partner after causing them to cross a state line. Once again, the
201. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (explaining "aggregate effects" test).
202. For a demonstration of this principle, see United States v. Sirois, 87 F.3d 34 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 328 (1996). Sirois had photographed the sexual activity of teenage boys,
violating 18 U.S.C. § 2251. See id. at 37 & n.1. That statute criminally punished those who
involved minors in "sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of
such conduct." See id. Guilt also required that the "visual depiction ha[d] actually been transported
in interstate or foreign commerce or mailed," or that the person knew of a future transportation. See
id. The Second Circuit did not require that the defendant's photography be for commercial gain,
but upheld the statute based solely on the presence of its jurisdictional element. See id. at 40.
203. For an illustration of the "nit-picldng" of some "insufficiency" challenges, see United
States v. Clayton, 108 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 233 (1997). Clayton was
convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1029 for possessing 15 illegally "cloned" cellular telephones--the
statutory language required a minimum of 15 phones before a violation would occur. See id. at
1116. Clayton argued the government must prove that the individual possession of each of the 15
phones substantially affected interstate commerce. See id. Not impressed, the court explained that
telephones were "instrumentalities" of interstate commerce that are regulated under the second
Lopez category. See id. at 1117.
204. See infra section V. (discussing civil prong).
205. The criminal prong of the VAWA provides, in relevant part:
(a) Offenses.-(1) Crossing a State line.-A person who travels across a State line
orenters or leaves Indian country with the intent to engage in conduct that-(A)(i)
violates the portion of a protection order that involves protection against credible
threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury to the person or persons
for whom the protection order was issued... shall be punished as provided in
subsection (b).
(2) Causing the crossing of a State line.-A person who causes a spouse or
intimate partner to cross a State line or to enter or leave Indian country by force,
coercion, duress, or fraud, and, in the course or as a result of that conduct,
intentionally commits an act that injures the person's spouse or intimate partner
in violation of a valid protection order issued by a State shall be punished as
provided in subsection (b).
18 U.S.C.A. § 2262 (West Supp. 1997).
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mere crossing of a state line provides federal jurisdiction.
While the Second Circuit has upheld the law,0 6 a Nebraska district
court struck it down in United States v. Wright.207 Violating a state court
protection order, Wright followed a woman from Nebraska to Iowa,
entered her premises, threw a brick through her window, and followed her
back to Iowa.' 8 The district court found no jurisdiction, however, refusing
to accept mere line-crossing as satisfying the third Lopez category. 2 9
The Eighth Circuit reversed and upheld the statute."' While agreeing
with the district court that the language did not satisfy the third category of
Lopez, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that the requirement for interstate travel
directly implicated interstate commerce-the second Lopez category.21
The court implied that the activity of a person crossing a state line is
subject to regulation as interstate commerce. 1 2
Moreover, the court expressed concern that invalidating the VAWA
could lead to the downfall of various other statutes that regulated mere
line-crossing.1 3 Finally, the court expressly recognized the legislation as
preventing the use of the channels of interstate commerce for immoral
purposes-the first Lopez category.2" 4
The Eighth Circuit took a novel approach by upholding the VAWA
without relying on the jurisdictional element. By doing so, however, the
court left open the question whether the mere crossing of a state line can
ever satisfy the third Lopez category.
3. Transport or Possession of Stolen Goods
Two related statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314215 and 2315,216 prevent the sale,
206. See United States v. Gluzman, 154 F.3d (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming the VAWA where a
woman conspired to murder her husband, which took place after the murderer and victim crossed
from New Jersey to New York).
207. 965 F. Supp. 1307 (D. Neb. ), rev'd, 128 F.3d 1274 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 1376 (1998).
208. See id.at 1309.
209. See id.
at 1313-14.
210. United States v. Wright, 128 F.3d 1274, 1276 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
1376 (1998).
211. Seeid. at1275.
212. See id.
213. "Ifcrossing state lines for noncommercial purposes is not interstate commerce, however,
the validity of a number of statutes besides § 2262(a)(1) would be in doubt." Id.
214. See id. at 1276.
215. This statute provides, in relevant part: "Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers in
interstate or foreign commerce any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the value
of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud... [s]hall
be fined.. ." 18 U.S.C.S. § 2314 (Law. Co-op 1991).
216. This statute provides, in relevant part:
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transportation, or possession of stolen goods which have crossed state or
federal boundaries. The very nature of these offenses-stealing articles and
transporting2 17them to other states-seems to indicate a relation to interstate
commerce.

Both of these statutes have recently been upheld against Lopez
challenges for reasons quite apart from their jurisdictional elements,
however. The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Veatch,18 upheld 18
U.S.C. §2314 under the first Lopez category, since transportation of stolen
goods would, in effect, subject the channels of interstate commerce to
immoral purposes. 219
Likewise, in United States v. Trupin,22 the Second Circuit upheld 18
U.S.C § 2315 under the first Lopez category.221 Trupin, convicted of
possessing a stolen Chagall painting worth over $100,000, argued that
federal prosecution for mere possession of stolen goods offended the
principles outlined in Lopez.22 The court, however, looked to the
requirement that the stolen goods cross a state line, and concluded that this,
too, regulated the "channels" of interstate commerce.223
Regarding the third Lopez category, the court stated that 18 U.S.C. §
Whoever [knowingly] receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or
disposes of any goods, wares, or merchandise, securities, or money of the value
of $5,000 or more .... which have crossed a State or United States boundary after
being stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken .... ; or Whoever [knowingly]
receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells, ordisposes of any falsely make,
forged, altered, or counterfeited securities or tax stamps.... moving as, or which
are a part of, or which constitute interstate or foreign commerce, .. . ; or
Whoever [knowingly] receives in interstate or foreign commerce, or conceals,
stores, barters, sells, or disposes of, any tool, implement, or thing used or intended
to be used in falsely making, forging, altering, or counterfeiting any security or tax
stamp, or any part thereof, moving as, or which is a part of, or which constitutes
interstate or foreign commerce.... [s]hall be fined [under this title] or imprisoned
not more than ten years, or both.
18 U.S.C.S. § 2315 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
217. Once a court defines activity as "commercial" it has virtually accepted that it can be
federally regulated using an "aggregate effects" reasoning. For an example, see infra Part V.F.
218. 121 F.3d 719, 1997 WL 418886 (9th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision)
(emphasizing the broad language of the law and the obvious effect on commerce).
219. See id. at *1-3.
220. 117 F.3d 678 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 699 (1998). Trupin, a wealthy
businessman, had made the acquaintance of a down-and-out artist, who he employed for various
projects. See id. at 680. However, Trupin knowingly purchased a stolen painting---"Le Petit
Concert" byChagall-for$100,000 from the artist. See id. When Trupin attempted to sell the stolen
painting years later, a suspicious buyer tipped offthe FBI, leading to Trupin's arrest and conviction.
See id. at 681.
221. See id. at 684.
222. See id. at 682.
223. See id. at 682-84.
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2315 concerned commerce by seeking to "eradicate the interstate... traffic
in stolen goods.., to protect legitimate trade." 224 The de minimis nexus
withstood scrutiny, with the court noting that some valid statutes possessed
no jurisdictional element at all.22
The statutes in this section use similar jurisdictional elements; yet, the
courts employ a diversity of methods to uphold them. In the Hobbs Act,
courts simply accept the de minimis nexus as sufficient. 226 In the VAWA 227
and stolen goods laws, courts sometimes ignore the jurisdictional element
and rely on the first and second Lopez categories, instead.228
The lesson is clear: statutes with jurisdictional elements are almost
impervious to facial challenge. When the jurisdictional element may not
suffice, a court can turn to one of the other available arguments, as
explored in section V of this casenote.
V. CHALLENGES TO CONGRESS' COMMERCE POWER AFTER
LOPEZ: THE COMMERCIAL CONNECTION

A. FirearmsActs
As seen in section IV of this casenote, if a firearms law contains a
jurisdictional element, courts usually uphold it without further discussion.
However, as this sub-section explores, when the jurisdictional element is
missing, courts use various other means to uphold this type of legislation.
1. Disposal of Firearms to Felons-18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1)
In passing 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1), Congress criminalized the sale or
disposal of firearms or ammunition to felons.22 9 Unlike most firearms
legislation, Congress did not limit enforcement of this statute with a
jurisdictional element.230
In UnitedStates v. Monteleone,231 the Eighth Circuit upheld the law and
224. See id. at 684.
225. See id. at 685.
226. See supra Part IV.E.1.
227. See supra Part IV.E.2.
228. See supra Part IV.E.3.
229. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 922(d)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1996). This statute provides, in relevant part,
for the punishment of those who sell or dispose of "any firearm or ammunition to any person
knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that such person-(I) is under indictment for, or has
been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year."
Id.
230. See generallyTom Stacy & Kim Dayton, The Underfederalizationof Crime, 6 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 247, 249-50 (1997) (arguing that the federal government is not as involved as
it should be to control street crime).
231. 77 F.3d 1086 (8th Cir. 1996).
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Monteleone's conviction for entrusting a firearm to his felon halfbrother." 2 Targeting the lack of a jurisdictional element, Monteleone
argued the statute could be applied unconstitutionally to purely intrastate
conduct.233 This reasonable argument flowed from language in Lopez.3 a
On de novo review, the Eighth Circuit evaluated the statute under the
third Lopez category. 235 First, the court concluded that firearm "disposal"
was inherently commercial.236 Second, the court found the statute was "an
essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were
regulated. ' 237 Finally, the court used the Wickard "aggregate effects"
reasoning to conclude that, when repeated elsewhere, this type of
commercial activity would substantially affect interstate commerce.238
The Eighth Circuit's key finding, that "disposal" was inherently
commercial, directly led to the result.23 9 Once a court deems a regulated
activity "commercial," the Wickard "aggregate effects" test becomes a
powerful tool.
2. Youth Handgun Safety Act-18 U.S.C. § 922(x)
The Youth Handgun Safety Act (the Youth Act) prohibits possession

232. A veteran Missouri firefighter, Monteleone foolishly entrusted his misfiring .45 caliber
handgun for repairs to his half-brother, who happened to be a convicted felon and who attempted
to sell the handgun to an undercover agent. See id. at 1088. When Monteleone petitioned for the
return of his seized handgun, he revealed his own crime. See id. The court reversed his conviction,
however, due to improper questions by the prosecution. See id. at 1089.
233. See id. at 1091.
234. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
235. See Monteleone,77 F.3d at 1092. The third category requires that the regulated activity
have a substantial relation to interstate commerce. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
236. See Monteleone, 77 F.3d at 1092. The court also noted explicit findings to support the
conclusion. See id.
237. Id. The statute, as originally worded, had limited its scope to licensed dealers and
manufacturers. This allowed easy circumvention by simply having a third party purchase the
firearm, and then distribute it to the felon. Congress amended it, therefore, to cover disposals by
"any person." 18 U.S.C.S. § 922(d)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1996).
Connecting a regulation to a national scheme is a common approach the courts use to uphold
various laws. For example, 18 U.S.C.S. § 842(h)-which has no jurisdictional element and
prohibits the theft of explosives-was upheld in this way by the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
Mikels, 110 F.3d 71, 1997 WL 143965, at *2 (9th Cir.) (unpublished table decision), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 136 (1997).
238. See Monteleone, 77 F.3d at 1092. The Lopez majority contended that the expansive
reasoning in Wickard was the furthest point that the Commerce Clause analysis should reach. See
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
239. See id. Once an activity is seen as "commercial," its regulation under a Wickard-type
analysis is simply a matter of multiplying the effect until the cumulative whole becomes
"substantial." See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125-28.
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or transfer of handguns or ammunition to juveniles.24 ° It resembles the
statute struck in Lopez because it regulates "mere possession" and lacks a
jurisdictional element.
In UnitedStates v. Michael R. ,24 a juvenile challenged the Youth Act
after police discovered his pistol during an investigatory stop.242 Noting the
lack of a jurisdictional element, the defendant argued that Congress
had
243
exceeded its powers in passing a noncommercial criminal statute.
The Ninth Circuit upheld the statute for two reasons. First, the court
found that the statute was part of a larger regulation of the "sale, delivery,
or transfer of firearms to a juvenile." 2' Thus, it regulated commerce by
targeting the supply and demand for firearms among juveniles."24 Next, the
court found that mere juvenile possession of firearms substantially
impacted interstate commerce for three reasons: (1) the movement of
firearms across state lines; (2) the deterrent effect of violent crime on
interstate travel; and (3) the relation of the activity to Congress' attempts
to control firearms and drug trafficking.246
Similarly, the First Circuit upheld the Youth Act in United States248
v.
247 Convicted of causing the transfer of a firearm to a juvenile,
Cardoza.

240. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 922(x) (Law. Co-op. 1996). This statute provides, in relevant part:
(1)It shall be unlawful for a person to sell, deliver, or otherwise transfer [to] ...
a juvenile(A) a handgun; or
(B) ammunition that is suitable for use only in a handgun.
(2) It shall be unlawful for any person who is a juvenile to knowingly possess(A) a handgun; or
(B) ammunition that is suitable for use only in a handgun.
(3) This subsection does not apply to-[exceptions].
Id.
241. 90 F.3d 340 (9th Cir. 1996).
242. See id. at 343. Tucson police made an investigatory stop of a pickup truck after Lt. Kidd,
an undercover police officer investigating gang-related activity, claimed that the occupants had
"mad dogged" him-a stem look commonly given by gang members as a prelude to violence-and
had recklessly attempted to pass his undercover police vehicle. See id. at 342-43. Michael R., one
of three juveniles hiding in the back of the pickup, dropped a small .22 caliber Jennings pistol as
he stepped down. See id. at 343.
243. See id.
244. Id. at 344.
245. See id.
246. See id. at 344-45. The Lopez majority rejected similar arguments regarding interstate
travel, and found significant the absence of a jurisdictional element which would ensure that a
particular firearm had crossed state lines. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
247. 129 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 1997).
248. See id. at 8.Cardoza arranged the sale ofa 9 mm handgun and nine rounds ofammunition
to a juvenile friend. See id. at 8. Cardoza held one round of ammunition in his hand as the two
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Cardoza argued that the transfer did not affect interstate commerce.249
Using the third Lopez category, the First Circuit found that it regulated an
economic activity: firearms transfers.250
As with the Ninth Circuit, the court justified the regulation of mere
firearm possession by linking it to a larger regulatory scheme." l Congress
had found that handguns often originate from out-of-state; supply and
demand within
a single state could substantially affect interstate
252
commerce.

3. Distributor Licensing of Firearms-18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a) and 924(m)
The brunt of the Lopez analysis focused on its third broad category.
Therefore, if the regulated activity can fit into the first or second Lopez
categories, 2 3 some lower courts avoid Lopez entirely.2 4 Courts have taken
this approach in evaluating 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) 55 and § 924(m).5 6
In combination, these two statutes prohibit unlicensed persons from
engaging in the firearms business-§ 922(a)(1)(A)-or from traveling
across state lines to attempt illegal firearms dealings-§ 924(m).

walked down the street, and inadvertently revealed it to a police officer during a subsequent
discussion while gesturing with his hand. See id. at 8-9.
249. See id. at 11.
250. See id. at 12.
251. See id.
252. See id. at 13.
253. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
254. To avoid Lopez, those courts simply conclude that the Lopez analysis is inapplicable to
its first or second categories. Courts prefer this technique because it avoids the sometimes-difficult
search for a substantial relation to interstate commerce.
255. This statute provides, in relevant part:
(a) It shall be unlawful(1) for any person(A) except a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer, to
engage in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, or in
the course of such business to ship, transport, or receive any firearm in interstate
or foreign commerce....
18 U.S.C.S. § 922(a)(1)(A) (Law. Co-op. 1996).
256. This statute provides, in relevant part:
A person who, with the intent to engage in conduct that constitutes a violation of
section 922(a)(1)(A), travels from any State or foreign country into any other State
and acquires, or attempt to acquire, a firearm in such other State in furtherance of
such purpose shall be imprisoned for not more than 10 years.
18 U.S.C.S. § 924(n) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (renumbered from 18 U.S.C.S. § 924(m) (Law. Coop. 1996)).
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In United States v. Boone,z 7 the northern district of Indiana and the
Seventh Circuit"' heard challenges to both statutes. Convicted for illegally
dealing in firearms, 59 Boone argued that dealing in firearms was a non2
economic activity that had no substantial relation to interstate commerce .2 60
6t
First, the district court dismissed Boone's challenge to section 924(m).
Finding that the statute required the crossing of a state line, the court
determined that it clearly implicated the first Lopez category-the use of
the "channels" of interstate commerce. 262
In a separate order, the district court also dismissed the challenge to §
922(a)(1)(A).2 63 The court found that Congress meant to establish a
nationwide licensing requirement. 4 Moreover, since interstate firearms
trafficking was a serious problem, the court concluded that it substantially
affected interstate commerce.265
In affirming the order, the Seventh Circuit took a simpler approach. The
court simply stated that "dealing in firearms epitomizes commercial
activity" and that the legislative history of the Gun Control Act of 1968
clearly showed how such dealing affects interstate commerce.26
4. Machine Gun Ban-1 8 U.S.C. § 922(o)
An oft-challenged firearms statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (the Machine
Gun Ban) simply bans the possession of machine guns after the effective
date of the legislation-May 18, 1986.267 There is no jurisdictional

257. 904 F. Supp. 866 (N.D. Ind. 1995), aff'd, 108 F.3d 1380 (7th Cir. 1997); 904 F. Supp.
868 (N.D. Ind. 1995), afT'd, 108 F.3d 1380 (7th Cir. 1997).
258. 108 F.3d 1380, 1997 WL 117266, at *1 (7th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision).
259. After having his Lopez argument rejected at the trial court, Boone pled guilty to the
unlicensed firearms dealing of 200 handguns in a single year-purchasing them in Indiana and reselling them in Illinois. See id.
260. See id.
261. See Boone, 904 F. Supp. at 867-68.
262. See id. at 868.
263. See id. at 869.
264. See id.
265. See id. at 870.
266. See Boone, 108 F.3d, 1997 WL 117266 at *1.
267. The Machine Gun Ban provides, in relevant part:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), it shall be unlawful for any person to
transfer or possess a machine gun.
(2) This subsection does not apply with respect to-(A) a transfer to or by, or possession by or under the authority of, the United
States or any department or agency thereof or a State, or a department, agency, or
political subdivision thereof; or
(B) any lawful transfer or lawful possession of a machine gun that was lawfully
possessed before the date this subsection takes effect.
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element. Of all firearms laws, this one has raised the most controversy and
come closest to being struck down after Lopez.
In the first post-Lopez challenge to this statute, UnitedStates v. Wilks,268
the Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction of a gun shop owner.269 The court
found that machine guns, themselves, were articles of interstate commerce
to be regulated as "instrumentalities"--the second Lopez category.270
Moreover, the court examined the legislative history of various gun control
measures 27' and determined that Congress intended to regulate the
interstate machine gun market.272
The Fifth Circuit almost struck this statute in United States v. Kirk.273
Charged with selling unregistered machine guns,274 Kirk argued that the
statute unconstitutionally regulated mere intrastate possession of machine
guns.275 A three-judge panel, citing Wilks, found that the law closely
resembled a market control of the "channels" of commerce-the first
Lopez category.276 A strong dissent, 2' however, disagreed, terming the law
a congressional intrusion into a noncommercial intrastate activity.2 78
Vacating the panel opinion and accepting a rehearing of the case en

18 U.S.C.S. § 922(o) (Law. Co-op. 1996).
268. 58 F.3d 1518 (10th Cir. 1995). Decided in July 1995, this decision closely followed on
the heels of Lopez.
269. Wilks operated a gun shop in Tulsa, Oklahoma. See id. at 1519. He sold three machine
guns to undercover ATF agents, who later found two other machine guns during a search of his
home. See id.
270. See id. at 1521.
271. Specifically, the court discussed the Omnibus Act, Gun Control Act of 1968, and Firearm
Owners' Protection Act. See id. at 1521-22.
272. See id. at 1522.
273. 70F.3d791 (5th Cir. 1995), aff'den banc by an equally dividedcourt, 105 F.3d 997 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 47 (1997).
274. Between September 1988 and February 1989, Kirk sold multiple unregistered machine
guns to Donald Mueller, some personally converted from semi-automatic firearms. See id. at 792.
After the ATF monitored Kirk's meetings through a third party informant, they arrested him in
November 1989 and charged him under § 922(o). See id. at 792-93.
275. See id. at 796, 797 n.9.
276. See id. at 796.
277. See id. at 798 (Jones, L, dissenting) (Judge Edith Jones wrote the panel dissent and the
"dissent" in the en banc rehearing of this appeal).
278. Judge Jones agreed that Lopez did not control the case, but disagreed with the majority
and Wilks reasoning, finding no distinction between § 922(o) and the fallen Lopez statute. See id.
Her dissent emphasized that the legislative history and plain language of the statute revealed that
it punished mere possession. See id. at 799 (Jones, J., dissenting). As such, it could not be
supported under the first or second categories. See id. Looking to the legislative history of prior
firearms laws, Judge Jones faulted the majority's characterization of it as market regulation. See id.
at 800-01 (Jones, J., dissenting).
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banc,279 the Fifth Circuit split down the middle, thus affirming the
conviction by default."' Those judges supporting the Machine Gun Ban
argued, despite few congressional findings, that Congress could rationally
connect machine guns with narcotics trafficking and other federal
crimes.2"' Those in opposition2 .2 argued that machine guns are not
"channels" 2 3 or "instrumentalities" of interstate commerce.2 "4 Further, they
stated that the ban failed under the third Lopez category, mere possession
is neither an economic activity nor part of a larger commercial
regulation.28 5
One year later, the Fifth Circuit addressed this question again in United
States v. Knutson.286 Decided by three Kirk supporters of the law, the court
upheld the statute under the third Lopez category.
Its effect on interstate
27
commerce was "obvious 'to the naked eye.'
The Third Circuit faced disagreement on the same issue in United
States v. Rybar."' Making a federalism-based argument, Rybar contended
that the Machine Gun Ban unduly infringed on Pennsylvania's machine
gun laws. 2 9 As with other circuits,' however, the majority looked to the
commercial nature of the activity to hold that the statute could be sustained
279. 105 F.3d 997 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 47 (1997).
280. See id. at 998.
281. See id. at 1000-01.
282. The eight en bancjudges supporting reversal included Judge Garwood, the author of the
Fifth Circuit's Lopez decision. See id. at 1005. Judge King, the other remaining judge from the
original Lopez decision, joined those supporting the conviction. See id. at 997.
283. Other circuits have found the first Lopez category best fits § 922(o). See United States
v. Rambo, 74 F.3d 948,952 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that § 922(o) regulates "channels" of interstate
commerce by regulating interstate trafficking of machine gun commodities).
284. See Kirk, 105 F.3d at 1013.
285. See id. at 1013-16.
286. 113 F.3d 27 (5th Cir. 1997). Steven Scott Knutson possessed a .45 caliber Spitfire assault
rifle, which he acquired after May 19, 1986. See id. at 28.
287. See id. at 30. The three-judge panel relied on prior congressional firearms findings, and
refused to negate the statute based on the rare occurrence when a machine gun may be
manufactured entirely intrastate. See id. at 30-3 1.
288. 103 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 46 (1997). Rybar, a federallylicensed firearms dealer, sold two unlawful machine guns and two unregistered firearms at a
Pennsylvania gun show. See id. at 275.
289. See id. at 277-78.
290. See United States v. Kenney, 91 F.3d 884, 889-91 (7th Cir. 1996) (agreeing with the Kirk
dissent that § 922(o) does not fit into the first or second category because it is a larger regulation
of economic activity and is well-supported by prior legislative findings). The Eleventh Circuit has
also upheld § 922(o) under the third category of Lopez twice in 1997. See United States v. Wright,
117 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11 th Cir.) (upholding the law because the total demand-side market control
of machine guns constituted part of a larger scheme to regulate trade in them), cert. denied, 118
S.Ct. 584 (1997); United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 1393 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Wright in
upholding the conviction of a federally-licensed firearms dealer who crafted an elaborate scheme
to purchase machine guns allegedly for use by law enforcement agencies).
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under the third Lopez category as a "demand-side measure to lessen...
'
commerce in machine guns."291
The dissent contended that the statute could not fall into the first or
second category of Lopez since it neither required an interstate transfer nor
attempted to prevent harm to people or goods traveling interstate.2"
Regarding the third category, the dissent pointed out that Lopez denied
Congress the expansive power to regulate every item that has an interstate
market.293 Moreover, no study had been produced, substantially linking
machine gun possession with interstate crimes.294
Finally, a Sixth Circuit panel in UnitedStates v. Beuckelaere29 5 upheld
the Machine Gun Ban using the arguments already discussed,2 96 but also
drew a dissent that articulated the typical counter-arguments. 29 While the
market-control argument is novel, the Machine Gun Ban is not the only
criminal statute that has been upheld in this manner.298
As discussed in section IV, courts can uphold firearms laws using a
variety of means. Even where Congress has criminalized mere possession
of firearms-the sin of Lopez--courts defer to congressional findings.299
This leaves little room for "as applied" sufficiency attacks, and forces
challengers to target the noncommercial aspects of the regulated activity.
Thorough research into the legislative history of the statute, and of other
firearms statutes, is essential.
B. EnvironmentalActs
As discussed in section IV,the Clean Water Act has suffered minor
setbacks after Lopez. Environmental acts without jurisdictional elements

291. See Rybar, 103 F.3d at 283.
292. See id. at 288-90 (Alito, J., dissenting).
293. See id. at 292 (Alito, J., dissenting).
294. See id.
295. 91 F.3d 781 (6th Cir. 1996). Thomas Beuckelaere's brother informed police of illegal
assault weapons at the defendant's residence. Some of the parts were purchased in Kentucky and
transferred to Ohio. See id. at 782, 786.
296. First, the court found that the law regulated the national market for machine guns by
prohibiting their transfer and possession. See id. at 784. Second, machine guns are "things" in
interstate commerce that flow interstate for profit. See id. at 786. Finally, the majority tried to allay
the fears in Lopez, noting that the law (1) did not limit its reach to a specific geographical area, such
as a school zone; (2) ensured that only machine guns transferred illegally would be covered; and
(3) only interfered with possession of the most dangerous firearms. See id. at 787.
297. See id. at 787-88 (Suhrheirich, J., dissenting). The dissent relied on arguments made
against the statute in Kirk. See id.; supra notes 277-78 and accompanying text.
298. On 18 U.S.C. § 842(i)'s prohibition of shipping explosives, the Ninth Circuit upheld the
statute as a market regulation in United States v. Hermanson, 91 F.3d 156, 1996 WL 387654, at

*2 (9th Cir.) (unpublished table decision), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 446 (1996).
299. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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have also been challenged, including the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA),3°° the
Lacey Act, 0 1 the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 2 and the Bald Eagle
Protection Act (BEPA). 3
1. CERCLA-42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq.
A major piece of environmental legislation, CERCLA creates civil
liability among polluters to help fund the clean-up of improper hazardous
waste disposal. 3 4 In United States v. Olin Corp,3°5 the first post-Lopez
challenge to CERCLA, the district court invalidated the use of the
statute. 31 Charged with over $10 million in clean-up costs after years of
alleged wastewater contamination, Olin challenged CERCLA when the
EPA refused to allow Alabama's environmental agency permission to
oversee the clean-up.0 7
Considering CERCLA under the third Lopez category, the court noted
that the contamination of Olin's property was not an economic activity. 0 8
Further, the government had not clearly shown that CERCLA regulated
activity with a substantial relation to interstate commerce. 3 ' Therefore,
CERCLA, at least as applied to the facts of that case, exceeded Congress'
commerce power.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed." 0 The court held that a
regulated activity need not be economic in nature, as long as it
substantially affected interstate commerce. 31 1 Looking to CERCLA's scant

300. See infra Part V.B.1.
301. See infra notes 320-24 and accompanying text.
302. See infra notes 330-41 and accompanying text.
303. See infra notes 325-29 and accompanying text.
304. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601-9675 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997), was amended by the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986.
305. 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996), rev'd, 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997).
306. See id. at 1533.
307. See id. at 1504-05. The Justice Department alleged Olin's chemical production plants in
McIntosh, Alabama released wastewater containing mercury and chloroform onto wetlands
bordering the Tombigbee River from 1952 until 1974. See id. at 1504. The plants ceased operation
in 1982; however, most of the damage was allegedly done prior to 1980, making CERCLA's
application retroactive. See id.Both parties signed a consent decree making all associated with Olin
liable for over $10 million in clean-up costs. See id. at 1505.
308. See id. at 1532-33. The court also recognized CERCLA did not contain a jurisdictional
element. See id. at 1533.
309. See id.
310. See United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997). The Eleventh Circuit
stated that the district court had erroneously interpreted Lopez as requiring statutes to possess a
jurisdictional element and to directly regulate economic activity. See id. at 1510.
311. See id. This particular issue, left unclear in Lopez, has resulted in differing interpretations
by the lower courts. Some, as here, hold that Lopez did not mandate that every federally-regulated
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legislative history, the court determined that Congress could regulate
intrastate pollution as part of its larger scheme to protect interstate industry
and commerce.3" 2 Therefore, whether Olin's personal activity affected
interstate commerce was irrelevant. 1 3
Following the decision in Olin, CERCLA was upheld again in United
States v. NL Industries,Inc. 314 NL Industries contested the degree of cleanup required to bring residential soil lead levels back within healthy
parameters as exceeding congressional power." 5 However, the court
rejected the argument, contending that CERCLA could be upheld under
both the second and third Lopez categories.316
Regarding the second category, the court determined that pollution,
itself, moves in interstate commerce through the air, soil, and water.31 7
Regarding the third category, the court used Wickard's "aggregate effects"
test to find that improper hazardous waste disposal was an economic
activity with a substantial interstate impact when considered in the
aggregate. 38" The reasoning of the N.L. Industries court has proved
persuasive. 1 9

activity be economic in nature. Others cite Chief Justice Rehnquist's language in discussing
Wickard to mean that activities that fall in the third category of Lopez must be commercial. See
infra notes 418-19 and accompanying text.
312. See Olin, 107 F.3d at 1511 &n.10.
313. See id. at 1511.
314. 936 F. Supp. 545, 552 (S.D. Ill. 1996). NL Industiries (NLI) operated a lead smelter
facility in Granite City, Ill. from 1903 to 1983, which resulted in the emission of lead onto the site
and into approximately 55 acres of surrounding residential area. See id. at 547. The unhealthy soil
lead levels exceeded 1000 parts per million (ppm) in some areas; the EPA determined to reduce that
to 500 ppm. See id. & n.1. NLI sought to enjoin the clean-up, contesting the "arbitrary" 500 ppm
goal, and arguing that 1000 ppm would be safe. See id. at 547.
315. See id.
316. See id. at 557-58.
317. See id. at 557.
318. See id. at 563. The court found that CERCLA regulated an economic activity because
improper hazardous waste disposal was often a commercial activity. See id.
319. Three other United States district courts have affirmed CERCLA, citing to N.L. Industries
for their reasoning. See Cooper Indus. v. AGWAY, Inc., No. 92-CV-0748, 1996 WL 550128, at
*10-11 (N.D.N.Y. Sep. 23, 1996); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., Nos. 87-CV-920 and
91-CV-1 132,1996 WL,637559, at*5-6 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 28,1996); NovaChem., Inc. v. GAFCorp.,
945 F. Supp. 1098, 1105-06 (E.D. Tenn. 1996). The United States Supreme Court interpreted
CERCLA in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 5 (1989), overruledon othergrounds,
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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2. Other Environmental Regulation: The Lacey Act-16 U.S.C. §§
3372 et seq.; The Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act-16 U.S.C. §
668; The Endangered Species Act-16 U.S.C. §§ 1531, et seq.
There have been few post-Lopez attacks on environmental laws;
however, those dealing with wildlife have drawn the most fire. The Lacey
Act32° prohibits traffic in wildlife taken, possessed, transported or sold in
violation of any state, federal, or foreign law. A district court, in United
States v. Romano,321 considered the Act in affirming the conviction
of a
322
hunter who violated Alaskan law by failing to obtain a license.
The court found the Act valid under the first Lopez category, since
Congress intended to remove contraband wildlife from the "channels" of
interstate commerce.323 The court also upheld the Act under the third Lopez
category because, by preventing extinction, the Act would ensure future
commercial exploitation of the species and its availability for use in
Alaska's manufacturing industry.324
Similarly, in United States v. Bramble31 the Ninth Circuit upheld the
Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (BGEPA),326 which makes it illegal
327
to possess, transport or deal in bald or golden eagles or their parts.

320. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 3372 et seq. (West 1985 & Supp. 1998). The Lacey Act makes it unlawful
to import, export, transport, sell receive, acquire, or purchase any fish or wildlife or plant taken,
possessed, transported, or sold:
(a)(1) ...in violation of any law, treaty, or regulation of the United States or in
violation of any Indian tribal law;
(2)(A)... in violation of any law or regulation of any State or in violation of any
foreign law...
(3) ...within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States

(o)It is unlawful for any person to import, export, or transport in interstate
commerce any container or package containing any fish or wildlife unless the
container or package has previously been plainly marked, labeled, or tagged in
accordance with the regulations ......
Id.
321. 929 F. Supp. 502,503-04 (D. Mass. 1996), rev'd, 137 F.3d 677, 678 (lst Cir. 1998).
322. See id.
323. See id. at 507.
324. See id. at 508.
325. 103 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1996). Bramble was prosecuted after showing illegal bald and
golden eagle parts to two undercover agents. See id. at 1477.
326. 16 U.S.C.A. § 668 (West 1985).
327. See id. This statute provides, in relevant part:
(a) Whoever... shall ...

take, possess, sell, purchase, barter, offer to sell,
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Setting aside Bramble"s contention that the BGEPA had nothing to do with
commerce, the court explained that the prevention of the eagle's extinction
substantially affected interstate commerce. 32 Conservation allowed "future
commerce in eagles or their parts; future interstate travel for the purpose
of observing or studying eagles; or future commerce in beneficial products
derived either from eagles or from analysis of their genetic material. 329
The Endangered Species Act (ESA),330 which makes it unlawful to take,
possess, transport, or sell endangered species, has not garnered the same
332
judicial support.331 In NationalAssociationofHome Buildersv. Babbitt,

purchase or barter, transport, export or import, at any time or in any manner, any
bald eagle commonly known as the American eagle, or any golden eagle, alive or
dead, or any part, nest, or egg thereof'ofthe foregoing eagles... shall be fined not
more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than one year or both...
(b) [C]ivil penalties... [may be assessed] of not more than $5,000 for each such
violation.
Id.
328. See Bramble, 103 F.3d at 1481. The federal district of Oregon used similar reasoning in
upholding the BGEPA, influencing the court in Bramble. See id. at 1481-82; United States v.
Lundquist, 932 F. Supp. 1237, 1241 (D. Or. 1996).
329. Bramble, 103 F.3d at 1481.
330. 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 1531-1543 (Law. Co-op 1984 & Supp. 1998). This statute provides, in
relevant part:
1538. Prohibited acts. (a)... (1) Except as provided in sections [1535(g)(2) and
1539 of this title]... it is unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States to(A) import... or export any such species from the United States;
(B) [the "Take" Provision:] take any such species within the United States or the
territorial sea of the United States;
(C) take any such species upon the high seas;
(D) possess, sell, deliver, carry, transport, or ship, by any means whatsoever, any
such species taken in violation of subparagraphs (B) and (C);
(E) deliver, receive, carry, transport, or ship in interstate or foreign commerce, by
any means whatsoever and in the course of a commercial activity, any such
species;
(F) sell or offer for sale in interstate or foreign commerce any such species; or
(G) violate any regulation pertaining to such species or to any [listed] threatened
species of fish or wildlife...
Id.
331. See Warner, supra note 157, at 356-64, for a discussion of ESA vulnerabilities to Lopez
challenges, especially where the inadvertent modification ofa habitat occurs during a non-economic
intrastate activity. But see Building Indus. Ass'n of'Superior Cal. v. Babbitt, 979 F. Supp. 893,90708 (D.D.C. 1997) (upholding the ESA over an as-applied challenge to the listing of fairy shrimp
as an endangered species, due to the potential effects of species extinction on industries and
commerce).
332. 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2340 (1998).
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a divided panel barely upheld the Act when the ESA prevented a county
from improving road access to a hospital, since the road access would
destroy the habitat of an endangered fly.333
The opinion of the court, comprising only one judge's analysis, found
the ESAjustifiable under the first Lopez category. 4 In that view, the ESA
enabled the government to stop immoral and injurious uses of "channels"
of interstate commerce.335 The judge also found the Act tenable under the
third Lopez category because it protected the commercial benefits of
biodiversity, such as the future potential medical uses of the species'
genetic makeup. 336 Finally, the opinion argued that the activity would have
destructive effects on other states through interstate competition.337
The concurring opinion disagreed, however, finding that the purely
intrastate species could not fall under the first Lopez category. 338 Further,
while rejecting part of the court's biodiversity explanation, the concurrence
concluded that the ESA's regulation of land development-a commercial
activity-offered the sufficient nexus to interstate commerce under the
third Lopez category.339
Finding the biodiversity and ecosystem rationales of the other judges
far too speculative, the dissent feared that an expansive reading of the
Commerce Clause would grant Congress unstoppable power.34 0 Further,
the dissent stated that killing flies was a noncommercial activity with no

333. See id. at 1048.
334. See id. Judge Wald, the author of the opinion, relied on Heartof Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 241 (1964) and explained that Congress could prevent the immoral
uses of these channels.
335. See NationalAss'n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1048.
336. See id. at 1054. Judge Wald used reasoning borrowed from the Romano, Lundquist,and
Bramble courts on the issue of biodiversity. See id.
337. Judge Wald also compared the ESA to the Surface Mining Act which was upheld by the
Supreme Court in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & ReclamationAss'n, 452 U.S. 264, 282
(1981), due to its effect on interstate competition. See NationalAss'nof Home Builders, 130 F.3d
at 1055; see also Johnson, supra note 157, at 74-82, for articulated reasons why the courts should
uphold the ESA in the face of Lopez challenges.
338. See NationalAss'n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1057-58 (Henderson, J., concurring
opinion).
339. See id. at 1058-59 (Henderson, J., concurring opinion). Judge Henderson disagreed that
the incalculable effects of a species' economic value could serve as the basis for a substantial effect
on interstate commerce. See id. at 1058. However, Judge Henderson also found that the actual loss
ofbiodiversity substantially affected our ecosystem, which in turn affected interstate commerce. See
id. at 1058.
340. See id. at 1060-64 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). Judge Sentelle could see no meaningful
distinction between the two biodiversity rationales, since both required speculation as to future
economic effect. See id. at 1063. He also found that Judge Henderson's ecosystem argument was
flawed because habitats were not "commerce" and to allow Congress to regulate every factor that
affected a habitat would give it unlimited power. See id. at 1064-65.
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substantial effect on interstate commerce. 341
Overall, the nature of pollution regulation has inevitably led to judicial
support. Not only can pollution spread over state lines, but clean-up may
involve out-of-state industry. Wildlife-related statutes, on the other hand,
rely on more tenuous support. Those statutes requiring that a species cross
a state line have not been seriously doubted. However, support withers
when courts must rely on the more speculative biodiversity argument,
especially where a species' habitat exists solely in one state.
C. ControlledSubstances Acts
Another active area of Lopez challenges, controlled substances acts
have shown as much resilience as their alter egos, the firearms acts. Courts
have readily accepted congressional findings that drug trafficking has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.
1. The Controlled Substances Act-21 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq.
The Controlled Substances Act 342 (the Drug Act), prohibits the
manufacture, distribution, or dispensation of controlled or counterfeit
substances, under penalty of jail. 43 The Ninth Circuit, in UnitedStates v.
Tisor,3" illustrated the typical argument courts use to uphold this statute.
Caught in a drug sting,345 Tisor argued that intrastate drug trafficking
did not substantially affect interstate commerce.346 Citing legislative
findings of the Controlled Substances Act, the court disagreed. The court
emphasized that intrastate drug sales contributed to the "swelling" of
interstate narcotics
trafficking, and found federal control of such activity
"essential. ' '347 Further, the court held that the Drug Act was part of a larger
regulatory scheme aimed at crininalizing all commerce in illicit drugs,

341. See id. at 1064-67 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
342. 21 U.S.C.S. §§ 801-841 (Law. Co-op. 1997).
343. This statute provides, in relevant part:
841(a) Unlawful acts ... it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or
intentionally(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or
(2) to create, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to distribute or
dispense, a counterfeit substance.
Id. at § 841.
344. 96 F.3d 370 (9th cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1012 (1997).
345. See id. at 373. Tisor fell prey to a Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA') undercover
operation, uncovering him as the source of an informant's methamphetamine purchase. See id.

346. See id.
347. See id. at 374.
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resulting in the required substantial effect."' A host of other courts have
used substantially similar reasoning to consistently uphold the Drug Act. 9
2. Drug-Free School Zones Act-21 U.S.C. § 860
Popularly known as the School Yard Statute, the Drug Free School
Zones Act 35 --counterpart to the Gun Free School Zones Act struck in
Lopez-extends harsher sentences to individuals violating controlled
substances laws within one thousand feet of a school zone.'
Courts have surprisingly upheld this Lopez alter ego with relative ease.
For instance, in United States v. McKinney,352 the Seventh Circuit upheld
the convictions of a cocaine dealer who had argued that the Act contained
no jurisdictional element and lacked any legislative history linking drug
dealing to interstate commerce. 353 The court responded by noting the
explicit congressional findings in the Controlled Substances Act, and

348. See id. at 375.
349. The following cases show widespread acceptance of this reasoning: United States v.
Westbrook, 125 F.3d 996,1009 (7th Cir.) (findingthat drugtrafficking affects interstate commerce),
cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 643 (1997); United States v. Eidson, 132 F.3d 43, 1997 WL 768304, at *1
(10th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision) (upholding conviction for marijuana production under
§ 841(a)); United States v. Lerebours, 87 F.3d 582, 584 (1st Cir. 1996) (affirming conviction for
crack distribution, since cocaine traffic is "hage interstate economic enterprise"), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 694 (1997); United States v. Genao, 79 F.3d 1333, 1337 (2d Cir. 1996) (affirming cocaine
conviction, since narcotics trafficking substantially affects interstate commerce); UnitedStates v.
Edwards, 98 F.3d 1364, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that Congress made findings to support
Drug Act), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1437 (1997); and, United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1112
(4th Cir. 1995) ("Congress made detailed findings that intrastate manufacture, distribution, and
possession of controlled substances ... requires the regulation of both intrastate and interstate
activities.").
350. 21 U.S.C.A. § 860 (West Supp. 1997).
351. This statute provides, in relevant part:
(a) Penalty. Any person who violates section 841 (a)(1) or section 856 of this title
by distributing, possessing with intent to distribute, or manufacturing a controlled
substance in or on, or within one-thousand feet of, the real property comprising
a public or private elementary, vocational, or secondary school or a public or
private college, junior college, or university, or a playground, or housing facility
owned by a public housing authority, or within 100 feet of a public or private
youth center, public swimming pool, or video arcade facility, is (except as
provided in subsection (b) of this section) subject to . . . [at least double
punishments plus an optional additional fine] ... [A] person shall be sentenced
under this subsection to a term of imprisonment of not less than one year.
Id.
352. 98 F.3d 974 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1119 (1997).
353. See id. at 979. McKinney had been videotaped selling crack cocaine "right next door" to
a public elementary school and "within 158 feet" of a high school. See id. at 976-77.
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contending that the link to interstate commerce is "readily apparent."354
McKinney also attacked the punishment-enhancing nature of the Act,
specifically targeted against school zones. 55 The court brushed this
argument aside, however, explaining that drugs sold within school zones
were equally likely to have traveled in interstate commerce as other
drugs.356 The court found no reason to prevent Congress from punishing
validly-regulated conduct in a school zone more harshly than when that
same conduct occurred elsewhere.357
Finally, the court distinguished the statute in Lopez by emphasizing that
it had regulated mere firearm possession-a constitutional non-economic
activity-while the Schoolyard Statute regulated the illegal economic
enterprise of drug trafficking.358 The other federal circuits have expressed
similar reasoning in upholding this oft-challenged Act.359 The Controlled
Substances Act has never faltered, and the Drug Free School Zones Act has
not gone the way of the Gun Free School Zones Act. Indeed, challengers
to these laws face almost unbeatable odds. Facially, the drug laws are
virtually impenetrable due to judicial acceptance of findings that
possession is linked to interstate narcotics trafficking. "As applied," the
absence of jurisdictional elements means that the government has no
burden to prove that the individual possession substantially affected
interstate commerce. 36

354. Id. at 979.
355. See id.
356. See id. at 979-80. One may argue that the court misinterpreted Lopez. Would not the
Supreme Court have come to the same conclusion with regard to firearm possession?
357. See id. at 980.
358. See id. The court may have gone out of its way to escape the shadow of the Gun Free
School Zones Act.
359. Several cases illustrate the popularity of this reasoning. See United States v. Henson, 123
F.3d 1226, 1233 (9th Cir. 1997) ("It would be highly illogical to believe that [drug] trafficking
somehow ceases to affect commerce when carried out within 1000 feet of a school."); United States
v. Jackson, 111 F.3d 101, 102 (11th Cir.) ('We adopt the reasoning of our sister circuits."), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 200 (1997); United States v. Hawkins, 104 F.3d 437, 440 (D.C. Cir.) ('While
mere possession ... may be noncommercial ... the schoolyard statute [punishes] possession only
when it is incident to a commercial activity."), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 126 (1997); United States
v. Zorilla, 93 F.3d 7,8 (1 st Cir. 1996) (affirming convictions for distributing 2 kg of cocaine within
1000 feet of a school zone, since drug trafficking is economic enterprise substantially affecting
interstate commerce); United States v. Orozco, 98 F.3d 105, 107 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Drug trafficking
is an inherently commercial activity; the mere possession of a firearm is not."); United States v.
Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135, 1140 (6th Cir. 1996) ("Each individual instance of cocaine dealing...
represents the end point of a manufacturing, shipping, and distribution network that is
interstate-and international-in nature.").
360. As long as the activity has a substantial relation to interstate commerce, the jurisdictional
element is not necessary. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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D. Child SupportRecovery Act
The Child Support Recovery Act (CSRA)3 61 of 1992 made it a crime
punishable by up to two years imprisonment for parents in a separate state
to willfully fail to pay past due, state-ordered child support. An early target
of Lopez challenges, the CSRA362 experienced a rocky road to acceptance
in the judicial community. 363 Despite being struck down by four district
courts, the CSRA has rebounded at the appellate level, where it has been
upheld using all three broad Lopez categories.
The winning arguments against the CSRA at the district level targeted
four areas. First, since criminal and family law are traditionally state
functions, the CSRA could unacceptably open the underlying state child
support orders to federal review.365 Second, nonpayment of child support
primarily affected parents, not outside commercial actors. 3' Third, child
support did not fit into either the first or second Lopez categories. 67
Fourth, the CSRA contained no jurisdictional element.368

361. 18 U.S.C.S. § 228 (Law. Co-op. 1993).
362. See id. This statute provides, in relevant part:
(a) Offense. Whoever willfully fails to pay a past due support obligation with
respect to a child who resides in another State shall be punished as provided in
subsection (b).
(b) Punishment ...[ranging from a fine to no more than 2 years imprisonment].
Id.
363. For a detailed discussion of the CSRA in relation to the three Lopez categories, see
generally Nicole M. Raymond, Comment, The ChildSupportRecoveryAct of1992-Is the Federal
Government's Involvement in the CriminalEnforcement of Child Support at an EndAfter United
States v. Lopez?, 101 DICK. L. REV. 417 (1997).
364. See United States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. 727,728-29 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (striking down
the CSRA and holding that Congress' attempt to regulate the family law marital relationship
offended concepts of federal-state "comity"), rev'd, 115 F.3d 1222 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S.Ct. 866 (1998); United States v. Mussari, 894, F. Supp. 1360, 1367 (D. Ariz. 1995) (finding
the CSRA unconstitutional because its application would "force federal courts to review and apply
orders of state courts in violation of principles of federalism and comity"), rev'd, 95 F.3d 787 (9th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1567 (1997); United States v. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360,364
(D.Ariz. 1995) (finding that many states already had relevant criminal laws), rev'dsubnom. United
States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1567 (1997).
For criticism of the Schroeder and Bailey decisions, see Jeanne M. Tanner, Comment,
Constitutionalityof the Child Support Recovery Act in the Wake of United States v. Lopez, 5 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 267, 280-84 (1997).
365. See Mussari,894 F. Supp. at 1367.
366. In United States v. Parker,911 F. Supp. 830,835-838 (E.D. Pa. 1995), rev'd, 108 F.3d
28 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 111 (1997), the district court struck down the CSRA because
it fit under none of the Lopez categories.
367. See Parker,911 F. Supp. at 842-43.
368. See Schroeder,894 F. Supp. at 365 ("a finding that because parent and child live in
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Many circuits have upheld the CSRA under the first or second Lopez
category, thus avoiding full Lopez analysis.369 In UnitedStates v. Bailey,37
over a sharp dissent, the Fifth Circuit overturned a district court's ruling
striking down the CSRA.371Bailey had relocated from Texas to Tennessee
and ceased paying court-ordered support for his four-year-old son.372 The
majority reasoned that Bailey's failed payments necessarily would have
moved in the "channels" of interstate commerce, thus implicating the first
Lopez category.373 Moreover, since the payment would be a "thing" in
interstate commerce, the second Lopez category applied. 74
Further, the majority rejected the argument that Congress had
bootstrapped federal jurisdiction to a state order, noting that Congress only
became involved when an individual moved out of state with the preexisting state-created obligation to pay.375 Addressing the federalism
argument, the court insisted that the CSRA simply enforced state court
orders, without reviewing them.3 76 Thus, any congressionally-mandated
7
intervention fell squarely within the parameters of the ConstitutionY
The lengthy dissent attacked the characterization of child support as
"commerce."3 7 Unilateral child support payments did not meet the original
definition of commerce as "trade. 3 79 Further, the dissent balked at the
"metaphysical" notion that a mere obligation to pay could be a "thing" that
moves in commerce.380 Finally, the dissent accused the majority of

different states establishes the necessary interstate nexus for Commerce Clause authority would in
essence give Congress carte blanche to regulate any area it deemed appropriate").
369. Many circuits have relied on the second Lopez category to avoid Lopez and uphold the
CSRA. See United States v. Williams, 121 F.3d 615, 619 n.5 (1 th Cir. 1997) (speculating that
even under the third category, Congress' extensive findings would support the substantial relation
to interstate commerce), cert.denied, 118 S.Ct. 1398 (1998); United States v. Bongiorno, 106 F.3d
1027, 1033 (1st Cir.) (acknowledging the CSRA could probably be upheld under the other
categories, also), reh'g denied, 110 F.3d 132 (1997); United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 476,479
(4th Cir.) (noting that "the Act requires ... the obligated parent and the dependent child reside in
different states"), cert.denied, 118 S.Ct. 258 (1997); United States v. Black, 125 F.3d 454,460 (7th
Cir. 1997) (following other circuits in treating Lopez as significant only under the third category),
cert. deniedsubnom. Davis v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 1821 (1998); United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d
101, 107 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Mhe transaction the parent is obligated to consummate is... in
interstate commerce."), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 784 (1997).
370. 115 F.3d 1222 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 866 (1998).
371. See id. at 1224.
372. See id.
373. See id. at 1227.
374. See id. at 1228.
375. See id. at 1230.
376. See id. at 1232.
377. See id. at 1232-33.
378. See id. at 1236 (Smith, J., dissenting).
379. See id.
380. See id. at 1237 n.10 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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transforming the jurisdictional nexus into a diversity requirement,
the "Interstate Commerce Clause" into simply an "Interstate
emasculating
381
Clause."
Responding to the dissent in a footnote, the majority attempted to allay
the dissent's concerns. "[Not] all interstate financial obligations are subject
to federal regulation[;]" however, "congressional attempts at the federal
enforcement of [interstate financial] obligations are [subject to federal
regulation] .... 382
The Ninth Circuit used similar reasoning in United States v. Mussari383
while overruling two district court decisions using the second Lopez
category.384 In a lengthy decision, the court explained how, through wire,
mail, electronic transfer, or personal delivery, debt payment involved
interstate commerce.385
Some courts have addressed the Lopez analysis squarely under the third
386 the Third Circuit reversed a district
category. In UnitedStates v. Parker,
court's decision to strike down the CSRA. 387 The court saw the
accumulation of child support debt as a local commercial activity with a
substantial national impact.388 Moreover, the court implied ajurisdictional
element because the CSRA always dealt with parents in separate states.389
Few other circuits have attempted this approach.39
The opportunity to facially overturn the CSRA no longer offers fighting
prospects: nine circuits have foreclosed that argument. Moreover, with no
true jurisdictional element, "as applied" challenges are unavailable. The
struggle over the CSRA illustrates how different courts, working from
various viewpoints, can uphold a statute using Lopez.
E. Violence Against Women Act (Civil Prong)
The civil prong of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)-passed

381. Id. at 1237, 1239 (Smith, J., dissenting).
382. See id. at 1229 n.8 (emphasis added).
383. 95 F.3d 787, 791 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1567 (1997).
384. See id. at 790. Prior to the district court dismissal, Mussari had been indicted for willfully
failing to pay court-ordered child support for his two children living in Arizona. See id. at 788. On
that same day Donald Schroeder was similarly charged for his failure to support his four children
in Arizona. See id.

385. See id.
386. 108 F.3d 28 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 111 (1997).
387. See id. at 30. Parker, a resident of Florida, had been accused of willfully failing to pay
past-due child support to his two children living in Pennsylvania. See id. at 29.

388. Seeid. at31.
389. See id. at30-31.
390. See United States v. Crawford, 115 F.3d 1397,1400-01 (8th Cir.) (upholding the CSRA
under both the second and third Lopez categories), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 341 (1997); United
States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999, 1003 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 753 (1997).
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under both the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment-creates a cause of action for victims of gender-based
felonies.39 '
While a handful of district courts have upheld the VAWA in various
settings,392 in Brzonkala,393 one district court found it unconstitutional.394
With a particularly disturbing set of facts-described in detail in this
casenote's introduction 395-a college student filed a civil suit under the
VAWA after two male students allegedly raped her on a Virginia campus.
The district court first determined that the VAWA did not fit under the
first or second Lopez categories, since the mere interstate travel of women
and their abusers was not sufficient to "qualify for the commerce
power.' ' 31 Under the third category, the court acknowledged congressional
findings on spousal abuse, 39 but considered the matter one for judicial
determination.398
The court noted similarities to Lopez, since the VAWA civil remedy
vindicated a criminal act, regulated a non-economic activity, and had no
jurisdictional element.39 Moreover, the court refused to apply the Wickard
"aggregate effects" reasoning to the inherently non-economic activity of
gender-based violence.'
On appeal, 4° ! a three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit overturned the
district court, but only over a strong dissent. The panel relied heavily on
Congress' "detailed and extensive" findings to determine that Congress

391. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
392. See Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531,540 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (upholding the civil prong
of the VAWA by an employee against her employer); Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188, 1194
(E.D. Tenn. 1997) (upholding the civil VAWA prong in a suit by a wife against her husband); Doe
v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375, 1423 (N.D. Iowa. 1997) (allowing a VAWA civil cause of action by
a parishioner against her priest), rev'd in part on othergrounds, 134 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1998);
Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 614 (D. Conn. 1996) (upholding civil portion of act by wife against
her husband); see also Melanie L. Winskie, Note, Can FederalismSave the Violence Against
WomenAct?, 31 GA. L. REV. 985, 1006-08 (1997) (criticizingDoe forignoring post-Lopez changes
in commerce clause analysis).
393. See Brzonkalav. VirginiaPolytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996),
rev'dsubnom. Brzonkala v. VirginiaPolytechnicInst. &State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997),
vacated, reh'g granteden banc, (Feb. 5, 1998).
394. See id. at 801.
395. See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text.
396. Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 786.
397. See id. at 788.
398. See id. at 788-89.
399. See id. at 789-90.
400. See id. at 791-93. For an argument that the district court interpreted Lopez too broadly,
see Winskie, supra note 392 at 1008-09.
401. See Brzonkala v. VirginiaPolytechnicInst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997),
vacated, reh'g granteden banc (Feb. 5, 1998).
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had acted rationally in passing the VAWA. 4m Further, the court found that
the VAWA did not interfere with areas of state control; instead, the statute
harmonized and protected state laws.'
The dissent disagreed, arguing that the majority had not conducted the
independent investigation required after Lopez.' Further, it accused the
majority of giving undue deference to pre-Lopez findings of a
congressional committee, ignoring changes in Commerce Clause analysis
brought on by Lopez.4' 5 The panel's opinion has since been vacated, and
the Fourth Circuit has granted a rehearing en banc.
Most federal circuits have not yet settled the VAWA's constitutionality.

Arguments still worth making emphasize the lack of a jurisdictional
element and that violence based on gender is a non-economic activity.
Especially in this area of family law, where states have traditionally
regulated, challengers should "wave the federalism banner." Despite an
arsenal of practicality and policy, the great deference for congressional

findings may ultimately save this law.
F. Freedom ofAccess to Clinic EntrancesAct
Codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248, the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances
Act (FACE) prohibits the intentional injury, intimidation, and interference
"by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction" of reproductive
health services facilities or places of religious worship.' Signed by

402. See id. at 966.
403. See id. at 970.
404. See id. at 974 (Luttig, J., dissenting opinion).
405. See id. at 974-76 (Lutting, J., dissenting opinion). For an analysis applying Lopez to the
VAWA civil prong and finding that it exceeds Congress' commerce power, see Jennifer C. Philpot,
Note, Violence Against Women and the Commerce Clause: Can This MarriageSurvive? 85 KY.
L.J. 767, 792-800 (1996).
406. The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE), 18 U.S.C.S. § 248 (Law. Co-op
Supp. 1997). This statute provides, in relevant part:
(a) Prohibited activities. Whoever(1) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures,
intimidates or interferes with... any person because that person is... obtaining
or providing reproductive health services;
(2) [or because that person is] lawfully exercising or seeking to exercise the First
Amendment right of religious freedom at a place of religious worship; or
(3) intentionally damages or destroys the property of a facility... because such
facility provides reproductive health services, or ... [is] a place of religious
worship, shall be [penalized] ....
(c) Civil remedies.-(1)Right of action.(A) In general. Any person aggrieved by reason of the conduct prohibited by
subsection (a) may commence a civil action ... (B) ... including temporary,
preliminary or permanent injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol50/iss5/3

52

Kolenc: Commerce Clause Challenges After United States v. Lopez
COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGES

President Clinton in 1994, the Act provides criminal and civil penalties.' °
As with other legislation challenged after Lopez, FACE received a mixed
review by the district courts, but strong support at the appellate level.
To date, the Seventh Circuit in UnitedStates v. Wilson" 8 has provided
the most thoroughly reasoned defense of FACE. Charged with criminal
activity for blocking a Milwaukee abortion clinic, the defendant raised both
Commerce Clause and First Amendment arguments. 409 Disagreeing with
the magistrate, the district court dismissed the charges. 410 The district court
found FACE failed to satisfy the first and third Lopez categories because
411
the congressional rationale could be applied to "any human activity.
While agreeing that the first Lopez category did not support FACE, the
Seventh Circuit did find a substantial effect on interstate commerce under
the third category.1 2 The court emphasized four "plainly rational"
congressional findings: (1) the abortion clinic operated in the stream of
interstate commerce by purchasing interstate supplies; (2) interstate
travelers sought abortions at clinics; (3) clinic obstructions decreased
nationwide availability of abortion; and (4) the problem had evaded state
efforts.413
The court also found that the Act regulated a commercial activity: "the
provision of reproductive health services. 414 This differed from the
defendant's argument that the actual activity being regulated was
noncommercial: "protesting at abortion clinics. 4 5 Finally, the court
refused to make a ruling regarding the second Lopez category, waiting for
further guidance from the Supreme Court. 416 The majority reasoning in

damages, as well as the costs of suit and reasonable fees for attorneys and expert
witnesses ....
[The plaintiff may elect, at any time prior to the rendering of final
judgement, to recover, in lieu of actual damages, an award of statutory damages
in the amount of $5,000 per violation.
Id.
407. See id. at § 248(b) and (c).
408. 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995).
409. See id. at 677. Wilson and other defendants used elaborate methods to blockade the
Milwaukee Wisconsin Women's Health Care Center in the hopes of saving the unborn children.
See id.
Wedging a car into the front entrance, they welded themselves into the car, with another car
similarly blocking a rear entrance. See id. Firefighters worked almost five hours to extricate the
defendants, preventing twelve patients from receiving abortions that day. See id.

410. See id.at 677-78.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.

Id. at 678, 680.
See id. at 680, 681.
Id. at 680-82.
Id. at 683.
Id.at 684.
See id. at 688.
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Wilson sums up the arguments other courts have used to save FACE.41 7
The Wilson dissent argued that federal statutes without jurisdictional
elements must only regulate actual economic activity.1 8 The key
interpretative difference between dissent and majority was whether the
statute regulated the protesting (noncommercial) or the abortions
(commercial).1 9 Moreover, the dissent noted that extensive state laws
regulating the
same conduct as FACE, added to the intrusiveness of a
42°
federal law.
FACE, by its own terms, regulates the conduct of private individuals
and not the actual activity of abortion.421 However, Congress and the courts
have agreed that those private actions substantially impact interstate
commerce. Therefore, if this seemingly innocuous conduct-blocking an
entrance to a private facility-can be regulated by the federal government
under the Commerce Clause,
some wonder why Congress cannot regulate
42
every human activity.

G. Miscellaneous CriminalStatutes
Emboldened byjudicial success, Congress has little incentive to restrict
legislation with jurisdictional elements, in spite of Lopez. This last subsection provides a diverse sampling of other statutes without jurisdictional
limits, which were upheld due to their relation to commerce.
1. Illegal Gambling Business-18 U.S.C. § 1955
The conducting, financing, or managing of an illegal gambling business

417. See Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575,587 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding that the noncommercial
activity was directly connected to commercial), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1838 (1998); United States
v. Bird, 124 F. 3d 667, 682 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming conviction under FACE where man
threatened abortionist doctor's life while he attempted to enter a Houston abortion clinic), cert.
denied, 118 S.Ct. 1189 (1998); United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913,920-21 (8th Cir.) (using
both the second and third Lopez categories to uphold FACE conviction for woman obstructing
entrance to Planned Parenthood abortion clinic), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 613 (1996); Terry v. Reno,
101 F.3d 1412, 1416-17 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("Congress' failure to use the magic word 'substantial'
is not fatal... since Congress passed the Access Act prior to Lopez."), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 2431
(1997); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520 (11th cir. 1995) (rejecting challenge of pro-life
women who felt their freedom of expression chilled after passage of FACE).
418. See Wilson, 73 F.3d at 690 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
419. See Benjamin W. Roberson, Abortion as Commerce: The Impact of United States v.
Lopez on Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, 50 VAND. L. REV. 239, 264-68
(1997) (arguing that FACE's regulation of non-economic protesting activity gives Congress a
national police power).
420. See Wilson, 73 F.3d at 693-94 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
421. To illustrate, consider that FACE also prohibits obstruction ofplaces of religious worship.
If FACE regulates abortion, it must also regulate religious worship.
422. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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is prohibited under 18 U.S.C. § 1955.423 Courts have upheld this legislation
with little hesitation.424
In UnitedStates v. Zizzo, 42 the Seventh Circuit articulated the common
rationale for the constitutionality of the law, in the context of a Chicago
organized crime syndicate.42 6 The defendants unsuccessfully argued that
Congress could not regulate their "purely local" operation.427 The court
found that the statute's requirements ensured that it only reached
commercial activity.428 Moreover, the court cited congressional findings
linking illegal gambling to organized crime-which, in turn, substantially
affects interstate commerce.429 Indeed, the facts of the case indicated that
Congress was correct: the defendant's operation was supporting organized
crime. 430 Courts use identical arguments when upholding other laws that

423. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1955 (Law. Co-op. 1991 & Supp. 1997). This statue provides, in relevant
part:
(a) Whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or part
of an illegal gambling business shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
(b) As used in this section(1) "illegal gambling business" means a gambling business which(i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision in which it is
conducted; (ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage,
supervise, direct, or own all or part of such business; and (iii) has been orremains
in substantially continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty days or has
a gross revenue of $2,000 in any single day ....
(d) Any property, including money, used in violation of the provisions of this
section may be seized and forfeited to the United States.
Id.
424. See United States v. Boyd, 149 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding none of the defects
of the Lopez statute); United States v. Joplin, 122 F.3d 1064 (4th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table
decision) (finding it immaterial that gambling enterprise was purely intrastate activity), cert. denied,
118 S. CL 870 (1998); United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1452 (6th Cir. 1996) (refusing to strike
law "[u]ntil the Supreme Court provides a clearer signal or cogent framework," citing extensive
congressional findings), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 690 (1997).
425. 120 F.3d 1338 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 566 (1997).
426. Defendants were members of the "Chicago Outfit," a crime syndicate engaged in loan
sharking and gambling. See id. at 1343. Opening bets "on credit," the crew often used muscle to
collect. See id. at 1344.
427. Id. at 1350.
428. See id.
429. See id.
430. See id. at 1351.
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regulate financial transactions 4 t or crimes.
2. Federal Carjacking Statute-18 U.S.C. § 2119
The Federal Carjacking Statute433 provides: "Whoever, with the intent
to cause death or serious bodily harm takes a motor vehicle that has been
transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce from
the person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation,
or attempts to do so, shall [be fined or imprisoned]." While this statute
possesses a minimal jurisdictional element, the courts have not relied on
that detail, upholding it on commercial grounds. 43
Using all the Lopez categories, the Tenth Circuit upheld the statute in
435 The court brushed aside defendant's
United States v. Carolina.
commerce power challenge, finding three justifications to uphold the
statute.436 First, the Carolina court noted that the statute regulated the
"channels" of commerce because carjacking affected both foreign and
interstate travel. 437 Next, the court stated two reasons why the law fit within
the second and third Lopez categories: carj acking resulted in higher vehicle
and stolen vehicle parts were sold in interstate
insurance premiums,
438
commerce.
Providing a more detailed analysis, the Fifth Circuit, in United States
v. Coleman,439 upheld the law using primarily the third Lopez category. 4 °

431. See, e.g., Brown v. Investors Mortgage Co., 121 F.3d 472,475-76 (9th Cir. 1997) (using
these arguments to uphold 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a's modification of state usury laws limiting
mortgage rates, where a woman lost her house after desperate multiple re-financing at over 16%).
432. See, e.g., Pic-A-State Pa., Inc. v. Reno, 76 F.3d 1294, 1302-03 (3d Cir.) (upholding 18
U.S.C. § 30 1's prohibition on interstate transmission ofdata to procure lottery tickets), cert.denied,
116 S.Ct. 2504 (1996).
433. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2119 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
434. See United States v. Hutchinson, 75 F.3d 626,627 (lth Cir.) (refusing to revisit postLopez circuit precedent upholding the statute), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 241 (1996); United States
v. McHenry, 97 F.3d 125, 129 (6th Cir. 1996) (relying on second and third Lopez categories), cert.
denied, 136 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1997); United States v. Randolph, 93 F.3d 656, 660 (9th Cir. 1996)
(using second category); United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 234, 236-37 (8th Cir. 1995) (using
second category to uphold statute).
435. 61 F.3d 917, No. 94-6439, 1995 WL422862, at *1 (10th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table
decision).
436. See id.
437. See id.
438. See id.
439. 78 F.3d 154 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 230 (1996). After two previous
unsuccessful attempts with different vehicles, Donald Ray Coleman caracked a Mercedes Benz
belonging to aTexas couple while in theirdriveway. See id.at 155. Coleman's companion, Beasley,
shot at the couple, missing the wife but hitting the husband; Beasley fired a second shot into the
man's head, killing him. See id.
440. See id. at 158.
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Noting the broad intent of Congress, 4" the court detailed some of the
findings linking carjacking to interstate commerce: (1) it was often part of
a vast, illicit interstate business; (2) consumers suffered "direct economic
losses" through theft and insurance increases; and (3) it required a
"comprehensive, national response."" 2 The court compared the statute with
the Gun Free School Zones Act and found little similarity. 3 The
carjacking statute involved a commercial activity, was supported by
adequate congressional findings, and possessed a minimal jurisdictional
element. 444
3. Federal Bank Robbery Statute
Codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2113, the Federal Bank Robbery Statute
criminalizes the taking of any thing of value from a bank, credit union, or
savings and loan association by use of force, violence, or intimidation."'
In United States v. Harris,446 the Ninth Circuit upheld this statute over the

441. The court recounted some of the broader provisions of the Anti-Car Theft Act, of which
the cariacking statute was simply one piece:

mhe Act not only criminalizes carjacking, but also increases the sentences for
importation, exportation, and interstate transportation of stolen vehicles, and
possession of such vehicles; establishes a national information system to check
motor vehicles; establishes a national information system to check motor vehicle
titles; decreases illicit trafficking in stolen auto parts by increasing the
requirements on manufacturers to identify auto parts and by establishinga national
information system for stolen auto parts; and tightens the supervision of customs
on exported autos.
Id.
442. Id.
443. See id. at 159.
444. See id.
445. See The Federal Bank Robbery Statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2113 (West Supp. 1997). This
statute provides, in relevant part:
(a) Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take,
from the person or presence of another, or obtains or attempts to obtain by
extortion any property or money or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the
care, custody, control, management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or
any savings and loan association; or
Whoever enters or attempts to enter any [of these institutions] ... with the
intent to commit ...any felony affecting such [institution] ...and in violation of
any statute of the United States, or any larceny-Shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
Id.
446. 108 F.3d 1107(9th Cir. 1997).
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challenge of a defendant who had conditionally pled guilty to the
offense. 7 The court found an implicitjurisdictional element in the statute,
since the statute required the financial institution to be federally insured."'
Moreover, the court held that financial institutions were "instrumentalities
and channels of interstate commerce."" 9 This being the case, the court
rejected the defendant's challenge.
Where Congress has made rational findings that link an activity to
interstate commerce, courts allow federal regulation. Ultimately, findings
may make the difference between a valid and invalid exercise of the
commerce power.

VI. A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO EVALUATING COMMERCE CLAUSE
CHALLENGES AFTER UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ

Reading United States v. Lopez, one might think that the Supreme
Court has opened the floodgates of successful commerce challenges. This
is not the case. Lower courts have easily avoided the decision's idealistic
language. A comprehensive study of lower court decisions reveals key
factors one should consider when challenging a statute passed under the
auspices of the Commerce Clause.
A. The JurisdictionalElement
The key threshold factor one should consider is whether the statute
contains a jurisdictional element. A jurisdictional element expressly
requires the government to prove, as an element of a criminal offense, that
an individual defendant's activity has affected interstate commerce. This
element comes in various phrases, but it will always require that the
activity "affect commerce," or that something "cross a state line." It may
be found either on the face of the statute or hidden in the definitions
section.
1. Facial Constitutional Challenges
If a statute contains a jurisdictional element, that fact alone almost
guarantees that it will survive a facial constitutional challenge. Courts have
traditionally accepted the presence of ajurisdictional element as sufficient
to establish the federal right to regulate in an area. Moreover, Lopez did not

447. See id. at 1109. The court found that Harris robbed a bank insured by the FDIC, since he
plead guilty to the crime and all its elements. See id.

448. See id.
449. Id. Contrast this view with the Second Circuit, which found that transactions with an
intrastate bank did not even meet a minimal nexus to interstate commerce. See supra notes 189-90
and accompanying text.
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squarely address the issue. In fact, Congress simply modified the Gun Free
School Zones Act struck down in Lopez and added a jurisdictional
element; all other language remained the same.450
Facial challenges against statutes with jurisdictional elements have
utterly failed in the lower courts. Federal courts since Lopez have rejected
every facial challenge brought against statutes regulating firearms, 451
arson, 452 water pollution,4 5 3 racketeering, 45 4 money laundering,4 5 articles
in commerce,456 and stolen goods.457
The only facial challenge that met with any initial success attacked the
criminal prong of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA).45 Using the
third Lopez category, the district court struck down that law because the
mere crossing of a state line did not "substantially" affect interstate
commerce.45 9 That argument may be the only hope for challengers of these
statutes. However, the Court of Appeals relied on the first and second
Lopez categories and reversed that decision.
2. "As Applied" Challenges
"As applied" challenges to statutes with jurisdictional elements come
in three varieties: (1) raising the required level of connection (the nexus)
between the regulated activity and interstate commerce; (2) questioning the
sufficiency of the evidence to satisfy that nexus; and (3) challenging the
time-frame of that nexus.
The first key "as applied" challenge explores how significantly an
activity must affect interstate commerce before the government can
establish jurisdiction in federal court. Lopez indicates that federallyregulated activities must have a "substantial relation to" or "substantial
effect on" interstate commerce."6 Does the statute expressly require this
"substantial" nexus on its face, or does it require only a de minimis
462
nexus?
A de minimis nexus, by its own terms, recognizes jurisdiction when an
activity affects interstate commerce in the slightest way. For example,
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.

See 18 U.S.C.S. § 922(q) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998).
See supra notes 72-75, 100-06, 112-14 and accompanying text.
See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 179-84 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 218-25 and accompanying text.
See supra Part IV.E.2.
See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

59

Florida Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 5 [], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

jurisdiction may be established if the activity merely "affects commerce"
or does so "in any way or degree."
If the law contains a de minimis nexus, challengers may argue that
Lopez implicitly requires more-a "substantial" nexus to establish federal
jurisdiction. This higher nexus would force the government to prove, as an
element of the offense, that the defendant's activity affected interstate
commerce in a significant way.
Challengers have unsuccessfully leveled attacks on de minimis elements
in firearms statutes, garnering judicial support only in minority opinions."'
Similarly, this argument has completely failed against statutes regulating
4
racketeering, 464 money laundering, 45 and articles in commerce. 6
However, challengers have achieved limited success against the Federal
Arson Statute, with many circuits finding that Lopez raised the de minimis
nexus to "substantial" in crimes of arson.467 There are two apparent
distinctions between arson and crimes that require only ademinimis nexus.
First, the other crimes are supported by more extensive congressional
findings that link them to interstate commerce, such as with firearms.
Second, some crimes by their very nature involve commerce, such as with
racketeering or money laundering.
Challengers have also achieved success against the Clean Water Act
regulations that attempted to establish federal jurisdiction over an activity
with the "potential" to affect interstate commerce.46 8 Apparently, the
federal government stretches its advantage too far when it blatantly
regulates activity that does not affect interstate commerce at all.
The limited success in this first "as applied" area must be tempered
with one important caveat: Lopez clearly does not require that every de
minimis nexus be raised.46 9 Using the Wickard "aggregate effects"
reasoning, the Lopez majority acknowledged that if an activity substantially
affects interstate commerce when repeated time and time again, then a de
minimis nexus is appropriate.470
A second "as applied" challenge attacks the sufficiency of the evidence
used to establish federal jurisdiction. This assault hopes that the
government has not produced enough evidence to establish the required
nexus between a defendant's conduct and interstate commerce. The

463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.

See supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
See supra Part IV.D.1.
See supra notes 178-84 and accompanying text.
See supra Part IV.E.1.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra notes 161-68 and accompanying text.
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
See id.
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argument can work even against a de minimis nexus.47
The Second Circuit accepted this type of challenge against the Money
Laundering Statute where all of the laundering occurred within the border
of one state.47 Even with a firearms statute, this argument may succeed if
the defense can show that a firearm and47 all
of its component parts were
3
manufactured within the state's borders.
A third "as applied" attack focuses on the time-frame of the interstate
activity. This argument contends that if an item's interstate movement
occurred significantly earlier than the prohibited activity, then the effect on
interstate commerce is too remote to establish federal jurisdiction. For
instance, if a firearm crossed a state line years ago and has just recently
been used illegally, its border crossing was arguably too remote in the past
to have any effect on interstate commerce. While not yet successful, some
judicial recognition of this argument's logic leaves it open as a possible
option.474
B. "Channels" and "Instrumentalities"
The Lopez decision focused on its third broad category: whether an
activity "substantially affects" interstate commerce. However, the Court
also mentioned a first and second broad category that apply when a statute
regulates "channels" or "instrumentalities" of interstate commerce.4 75 In
order to be constitutional, a statute need only satisfy one of these three
broad categories. If a court determines that either of the first two Lopez
categories apply, it can avoid the more difficult third category analysis.
Regarding the first broad Lopez category, Congress may regulate the
"channels" of interstate commerce. Courts interpret this category in four
ways. First, when a statute involves use of a transportation route, the
"channels" of commerce are clearly implicated. This is the case with
firearms laws that require the crossing of a state line.476 Environmental
statutes that prohibit "traffic" in wildlife, such as the Lacey Act and
Endangered Species Act, also fit under this category.477 In the same way,
the effect of carjacking on interstate travel necessarily affects these
"channels" of commerce. 478
Second, when an activity requires the use of electronic routes or the
mail, it must use a "channel" of interstate commerce. For instance, with the
471.
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CSRA, child support payments from a parent in one state to a parent in
another state use some "channel" of commerce.479 Likewise, electronic
transfers of money-the touchstone of modem banking48 -use routes that
support domestic and international commerce.
Third, when a law attempts to control the market of a product---"trade"
in its most basic sense-it affects the "channels" of commerce. For
instance, Congress intended to affect the supply and demand of machine
guns through tight regulation. 41 These market controls fundamentally
altered "trade" in machine guns, and thus regulated the "channels" of
commerce, since "trade" is commerce.
Fourth, when legislation seeks to prevent the "channels" of interstate
commerce from immoral or injurious uses, Congress acts squarely within
the first category. This was the purpose behind the statute prohibiting
transportation of stolen goods.48 2
Regarding the second broad Lopez category, Congress may regulate the
"instrumentalities" or "things" that travel in interstate commerce. This
category includes articles that regularly travel across state lines, and all
vehicles.
Congressional findings usually identify those articles that often travel
483
in interstate commerce. They include such items as machine guns,
resulting in the machine gun ban, and stolen vehicle parts, prompting the
federal carjacking law. 484 Even people may be considered "things" that
move in interstate commerce, as in the criminal prong of the VAWA. 8 5
Most clearly, the Hobbs Act regulates articles that, by definition, move in
interstate commerce.4 86
Some "instrumentalities" of interstate commerce are less clear. For
instance, courts upheld CERCLA because pollution moves in commerce
through nature.48 7 Moreover, payments that move across interstate wires or
the mail fall into the second category, as in the Child Support Recovery
Act,488 and with banking laws.489
If a court finds that either of these two broad Lopez categories are
satisfied, it may simply avoid any'discussion of Lopez. This technique is
an effective way for courts to distinguish Lopez, which focused on the third
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C. CommercialActivity
If a statute contains no jurisdictional element and cannot be justified
under either of the first two broad Lopez categories, a full Lopez analysis
of the third broad category may be in order. This entails determining
whether the law regulates an activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce.
A statute, on its face, may regulate a financial transaction, business
practice, or other activity that can be interpreted as "commercial" or
"economic." If it clearly regulates an economic activity it will most likely
survive a Lopez challenge, due to the Wickard "aggregate effects" test.
Courts will reason that, when repeated many times, the activity will
inevitably have a substantial relation to interstate commerce. 490 Even the
Lopez Court would not hesitate to uphold a statute that regulates a
commercial activity on its face.
In this way, courts have upheld statutes regulating the disposal or
transfer of firearms, finding that these are "commercial" acts.49 Likewise,
since child support involves a financial transaction, some courts conclude
that the CSRA must survive attack.492
However, not every statute passed under the Commerce Clause clearly
regulates an economic activity on its face. If one can convince a court that
Congress has attempted to regulate a non-economic activity, the chances
of success increase greatly. Examples of these successes are seen in
challenges to CERCLA, 93 the CSRA, 494 the civil prong of the VAWA,495
and the FACE. 41 In each of these instances, the regulated activity-for
instance, protesting at an abortion clinic-was not obviously economic,
and required explanation to the court.
Of course, a court might find that a regulated activity that is not clearly
economic still affects interstate commerce. The crucial factor that will
support this conclusion is the presence of adequatecongressionalfindings.
Congress may have made the sound determination that a non-economic
activity has a substantial relation to interstate commerce. Courts merely
require that Congress could rationally make that determination from the
findings before it.
Courts tend to give extreme deference to congressional findings. The
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findings can exist at any level, including committee reports and debates,
or they may come from prior legislation. It is not necessary that Congress
re-invent the wheel each time it legislates, as even the Lopez majority
acknowledged.497 If Congress has built up the institutional expertise to
make a rational determination about an activity, it makes no difference if
those findings occurred in 1968 or 1998.
Findings have been the key factor in upholding many statutes
challenged after Lopez. Findings saved the machine gun ban by identifying
it as a form of market regulation.498 Moreover, extensive findings that
linked drugs with interstate commerce rescued various drug statutes . 499 The
civil prong of the VAWA, struck down as non-economic at the district
level, was revived at the appellate level due to findings."°
Likewise, when lower courts struck down FACE because protests
against abortion were not economic in nature, appellate courts relied 50
on
congressional findings to link the activity with interstate commerce. '
Findings have also factored in to court decisions upholding regulations of
illegal gambling50 2 and carjacking.5 3
In short, challengers cannot become too hopeful even when a statute
regulates a non-economic activity, does not contain a jurisdictional
element, and does not fit under the first two broad Lopez categories. Unless
Congress has utterly neglected to make adequate findings, a court will
uphold that statute because the findings rationally support the conclusion
that the activity substantially affects interstate commerce.
D. TraditionalAreas of State Regulation
The final, and least persuasive, area worth considering is whether
Congress has traditionally left a particular area to state regulation. As Chief
Justice Rehnquist emphasized in Lopez, the concerns of federalism should
be part of any court's consideration of a statute."
If Congress has made a "sharp break" with past trends of legislation,
that may well add fuel to the challenger's fire. On the other hand, if
Congress has tread into this area time and time again, that will likely be
one more reason to uphold the law. Even if the legislation tramples on
state-trod grounds, Congress has every right to do so when the law is
supported by adequate findings.
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Lower courts have almost completely ignored this consideration. While
some courts have paid lip service to the concept, most await a clearer sign
by the United States Supreme Court that this concern is serious enough to
strike down an act of Congress.
VI. CONCLUSION
After discussing almost thirty statutes challenged between the 1995
Lopez decision and Fall 1998-with some minor challenges
omitted-several trends emerge.
First, federal district courts are slightly more willing to accept Lopez
challenges than are the federal circuits, themselves. Every time a district
court has struck a statute based on the Commerce Clause, a federal circuit
has reversed. Naturally, these frequent reversals will deter district courts
from overturning acts of Congress in the future.
Second, without further guidance from the Supreme Court the federal
courts are extremely hesitant to overturn acts of Congress under the
auspices of Lopez alone. The Lopez opinion, itself, is written in a way that
makes it easy to distinguish. While some language may indicate a changing
view of the Commerce Clause, that is unclear until further cases
substantiate it. For now, lower courts have limited reliance on Lopez to a
very narrow range of facts.
Third, those who choose to mount commerce challenges face an uphill
battle. Aside from Lopez, no significant commerce victory has survived the
appeals process.
Will the Supreme Court reinforce Lopez with yet another surprising bite
off the limits of the commerce power? If so, for such reinforcement to be
effective the Court must take one of two actions. Either it must overturn
much of the Commerce Clause principles adopted over the past fifty years,
significantly limiting the power of the federal government. Or it must make
it perfectly clear that application of the Wickard aggregate effects test-the
greatest tool for expansion-is limited to solely commercial activities.
Without such reinforcement, the lower courts will continue to largely
ignore the spirit of Lopez with impunity. And if reinforcement does not
come soon, Lopez may very well go down in history as yet another fuss
that was "much ado about nothing."
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